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Abstract 
 
My thesis examines the process by which the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
catalyzed Cairo’s transformation into an epicenter of the Arabist movement between 
1900 and 1918. I will explore a combination of British diplomatic sources and Arabic-
language publications in order to determine the role of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
in the burgeoning Arabist movement of the early twentieth century. In addition to 
contributing to our existing historical understanding of the development of Arabist 
ideology, this study will demonstrate the utility of analyzing centers of Arabism (in this 
case Cairo) that have often been neglected in contemporary nationalist historiography. 
 Cairo provides a particularly interesting case study in terms of Arabist 
cooperation in the years leading up to, and including World War I. In contrast to the 
societies in the more frequently analyzed Arabist hotbed of Damascus, Arabist societies 
in Cairo were extremely ideologically diverse and contained a significant percentage of 
Christians. In addition, these comparatively diverse Arabist societies in Cairo were 
among the most significant in existence in the years following 1908. Although a 
homogenous version of Arabism never emerged, my thesis argues that the Syrian 
intelligentsia was able to develop Cairo into an epicenter of the Arabist movement in the 
early twentieth century that, by 1912, began to usurp Damascus for political significance. 
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Thesis 
My thesis examines the process by which the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
catalyzed Cairo’s transformation into an epicenter of the Arabist movement between 
1900 and 1918.
1
 I explore a combination of British diplomatic sources and Arabic-
language publications in order to determine the role of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
in the burgeoning Arabist movement of the early twentieth century. In addition to 
contributing to our existing historical understanding of the development of Arabist 
ideology, this study demonstrates the utility of analyzing centers of Arabism (in this case 
Cairo) that have often been neglected in contemporary nationalist historiography. 
 Cairo provides a particularly interesting case study in terms of Arabist 
cooperation in the years leading up to, and including World War I. In contrast to the 
societies in the more frequently analyzed Arabist hotbed of Damascus, Arabist societies 
in Cairo were extremely ideologically diverse and contained a significant percentage of 
Christians. In addition, these comparatively diverse Arabist societies in Cairo were 
among the most significant in existence in the years following 1908. Although a 
homogenous version of Arabism never emerged, my thesis argues that the Syrian 
intelligentsia was able to develop Cairo into an epicenter of the Arabist movement in the 
early twentieth century that, by 1912, began to rival Damascus for political significance. 
The period and location analyzed in this study are significant ones. In terms of 
nationalist history on the Arab world, the early twentieth century is a period of 
incalculable importance. It is this era when numerous nascent identities (Arabism, 
                                               
1 It should be noted that in this study the term “Syrians” (al-Shwam) refers to individuals emigrating from 
the area of Ottoman Greater Syria (al-Sham). Generally speaking, the majority of individuals analyzed in 
this study will be from the areas of Damascus or Beirut. Furthermore, the term “intelligentsia” will be 
defined as individuals within the Syrian community in Cairo who take a critical political stance and make a 
significant intellectual contribution to the Arabist movement. 
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Turkism, Islamism, Zionism, etc.) that would impact the region for decades to come 
matriculated. Most existing studies of Arabism tend to either focus heavily on Damascus 
in terms of location or attempt to analyze Arabism in several areas rendering no single 
area studied in-depth. It is my contention that a systematic study of Cairo as a center of 
Arabism will further elucidate the size, nature and organization of the Arabist movement 
among the Syrian community in the early twentieth century. 
The following sections provide the background information and theoretical 
frameworks that are necessary to contextualize this study. Furthermore, this introduction 
will provide the reader with an outline for how the project will be set up, what sources 
will be employed and the historical context within which the events analyzed in this 
thesis take place. In an effort to appropriately situate this study within existing 
scholarship, a review of the literature will serve as a jumping off point. 
 
Review of Existing Literature 
I. Theoretical Framework 
On the concept of nationalism Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and David 
Lowenthal provide excellent studies. All three challenge the notion that nationalism or 
national identity should be seen as legitimate constructs.
2
 They adhere to the notion that 
“Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist”.3 Likewise, all three suggest that histories have been constructed 
to promote nationalism for a society’s “current needs” in spite of the “bias limits” of 
                                               
2 See Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism (1983), David Lowenthal The Heritage Crusade and the 
Spoils of History (1998) and Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities (1991). 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. (London: Verso Publishing Company, 1991): 6. 
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these narratives.
4
 It is this concept of nationalism that provides the conceptual framework 
for my study. 
In terms of conceptual frameworks regarding nationalist theory in the Arab world, 
James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni provide interesting insight. Jankowski and 
Gershoni suggest that, in order to discuss nationalism in the Arab Middle East, it is 
important to balance the scholarship regarding the “intellectual, political, socioeconomic, 
cultural, and psychological” on nationalism.5  Jankowski and Gershoni state that there are 
an insufficient number of studies that apply newer perspectives on nationalism (i.e. 
Gellner, Anderson and Lowenthal).
6
 They argue that the dramatic shifts in Arab national 
identity over time, as well as the different modes in which Arab national identity has 
manifested itself necessitate that nationalism in the Arab world be studied within this 
context.
7
 My study examines Arabism in the early twentieth century through this lens. 
At this point, the Syrian Arabist movement of the early twentieth century has been 
analyzed at length by many of the field’s most prominent scholars. Over time, a 
significant debate has emerged regarding the nature and significance of the Syrian 
Arabist movement in the early twentieth century. Within this debate there have emerged 
three predominant paradigms. The first is the traditional narrative which suggests that the 
Arabist movement in Syria was a movement of substantial size and influence and should 
be defined as a full-fledged Arab nationalist movement.
8
 The second is the revisionist 
paradigm which suggests that the Arabist movement in Syria during this era was a minor 
                                               
4 David Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998): XV. 
5 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997): X. 
6 Jankowski and Gershoni, XIII-XIV. 
7 Jankowski and Gershoni, XXIV-XXV. 
8 See George Antonius The Arab Awakening (1938). 
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movement that, ideologically speaking, was much less Arab nationalist in nature than it 
was Islamist.
9
 The third is the “revision of the revisionist thesis” paradigm which accepts 
the fact that Syrian Arabism during this era should be viewed as a “protonationalist” 
movement while at the same time arguing that the size and influence of the Syrian 
Arabist movement was much greater than the revisionists are willing to concede.
10
 With 
respect to the first two paradigms it is the third which will provide the framework for this 
study.
11
 It is this paradigm which will be used to define what is meant in this study by the 
terms “Arabist” and “Arabism”. This decision is largely the result of the fact that the 
sources that will be employed indicate that this is the framework with the most nuanced 
analysis of the early twentieth-century Arabist movement. 
 
II. Departures from Existing Scholarship 
My unique study diverges from existing scholarship in two major ways. This 
study also seeks to significantly expand upon two major areas of the current literature. 
First, my study departs from much of the existing scholarship on Arabism in this period 
in that it focuses primarily on Cairo as an epicenter of Arabism.
12
 Although some 
scholars of the period have implicitly
13
 or explicitly
14
 mentioned Cairo’s significance, an 
in-depth analysis is lacking. It is my intention that, by diverging from the tendency to 
                                               
9 See C. Ernest Dawn From Ottomanism to Arabism (1973), C. Ernest Dawn “The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism” (1993) and William Cleveland “The Arab Nationalism of George Antonius Reconsidered” 
(1997). 
10 See Rashid Khalidi “Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A Reassessment” (1993). 
11 As a result of this my study will not use the term “Arab Nationalism to describe the movement. Instead, 
the term “Arabism” will be applied to denote that the movement should be viewed as protonationalist. 
12 See Dawn (1973 and 1993), Philip Khoury Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of 
Damascus 1860-1920 (1983) and Zeine N. Zeine The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (1966). 
13 See Khoury (1983), A.A. Duri The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation (1987) and Eliezer Tauber 
The Emergence of the Arab Movements (1993). 
14 Khalidi (1993). 
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focus primarily on Damascus, my study contributes to the broader discussion of the 
nature and scope of Arabist ideology in the early twentieth century. 
 Second, my study departs from the existing literature by looking at the specific 
developments that allowed the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to set aside their ideological 
differences and transform Cairo into an epicenter of the Arabist movement. While most 
studies do mention that the vast majority of the Arabist societies in Cairo were founded 
by Syrians; there is little discussion regarding the factors that facilitated cooperation 
between ideologically divergent Arabists within this community. The comparative 
diversity of Caireane Arabist societies
15
 necessitates an examination of this process.  
 In terms of expansion on the current literature, my study first provides a more 
comprehensive discussion of Phillip Khoury’s assertion that it was the Syrians in Cairo 
which gave the Arab Revolt “Arab nationalist ideological content.”16 The contributions of 
the Syrian Arabists in Damascus to the Arab Revolt have been covered in detail in the 
existing scholarship.
17
 Some examination of Cairene Arabist participation in the early 
years of the war has been presented in other studies.
18
 However, a detailed study of the 
participation of the Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo vis-à-vis the broader 
Arabist movement during World War I is lacking. 
 Secondly, my study looks to expand on the current debate regarding the scope and 
nature of the Syrian Arabist movement by providing support for the “revision of the 
                                               
15 See Tauber (1993) 
16 Philip Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 77.   
17 See Zeine (1966), Kedourie (1974), Khoury (1983) and Dawn (1993). 
18 See Zeine (1966), Khoury (1983), Duri (1987) and Tauber (1993). 
 10 
revisionist thesis” paradigm.19 It is this paradigm which has inspired both the selection of 
Cairo as a unit of analysis, as well the type of sources that will be employed. The results 
of my study expand on the argument that this paradigm provides the appropriate lens 
through which to view Arabism among the Syrians in the early twentieth century by 
demonstrating that scholars who base there assessments of Arabism during this period on 
strictly Damascus-based studies are ignore significant portions of the Arabist movement. 
 
Aim and Scope 
There are five specific questions that guide my research: What are the ideological 
orientations among Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo? What events 
catalyzed cooperation among Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo? Is it 
justifiable to view Cairo as a center of Arabism comparable to Damascus? How does the 
Syrian intelligentsia catalyze Cairo’s transformation in to an epicenter of Arabism? To 
what extent were the Syrian Arabists in Cairo connected to the broader Arab 
independence movement during the years of World War I? 
 This project aims to contribute to current scholarship on both the micro and macro 
scales. On the micro scale I intend to demonstrate that, as a result of the activities of the 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia, Cairo should be discussed as important center of 
early twentieth century Arabism. Specifically, it is my aim to challenge the dominant 
paradigm that Damascus was unrivaled as the political center of the Arabist movement 
during this period. Though one could examine other centers to demonstrate this assertion 
                                               
19 Rashid Khalidi, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A Reassessment”. in The Origins of 
Arab Nationalism, ed. Khalidi, Rashid, Anderson, Lisa,  Muslih, Mohammad and Simon, Reeva S. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 52. 
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(specifically Istanbul) the comparative ideological diversity of the Syrian Arabists in 
Cairo make it a particularly fascinating case study. 
 On the macro scale, it is my intention for this study to enhance current 
understandings of the nature of Arabism in the pre-World War I and World War I eras. 
Much of the revisionist scholarship which focuses largely on Damascus has tended to 
downplay the scale and importance of the Arabist movement during this period.
20
 It is my 
hope that the analysis of alternative centers, in this case Cairo, will lead to increased 
understanding of the size and scope of the Arabist movement during this era. 
 
Methodology 
For my research, I use British diplomatic correspondences as well as books and 
journals written by Arabist members of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo in addition to 
press clippings from major Arabic and British newspapers of the era. My reasoning for 
selecting these sources is largely due to Khalidi’s assertion that in much of the 
scholarship regarding Arabism in this era foreign diplomatic correspondences, material in 
the press and writings of those involved in the movement have been underutilized. It is 
my aspiration that, by using these sources, my project can fill a gap in the existing 
scholarship.
21
 
The most significant Arabic-language sources that I utilized are located at the 
American University in Cairo library, as well as the Egyptian National Library (Dar al-
Kutub). The majority of the British periodicals and newspapers are housed in the British 
Library in London. The majority of the diplomatic correspondences are located in the 
                                               
20 See Zeine (1966) and Dawn (1973 and 1993). 
21 Khalidi, 54. 
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British National Archives. A limited number of British documents are also available at 
the American University in Cairo Library. 
The major Arabic-language periodical I consulted were al-Manar. Al-Manar was 
published by Shaikh Rashid Rida who held membership in several significant Cairene 
Arabist societies. In addition to his own writings, various Arabist members of the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo, including Rafiq and Hafiq Azm, Iskandar Amun and Muhammad 
Kurd Ali published essays in this journal.  
In addition to these publications, I examined books written by Arabist members of 
the Syrian intelligentsia in Egypt. Some of the books I am planning to analyze include 
Anthar Rafiq Azm by Rafiq Azm (1922), Al-Khilafa wa al-Imama al-'Uzma by Rashid 
Rida (1930) and Umm al-Qura by Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1901). These books are 
all located in Cairo. Rida and al-Kawakibi’s works are located at the American 
University Library, while Azm’s book is located at the Egyptian National Library. 
The British documents I consulted were primarily foreign office correspondences. 
Many of these documents will have been composed by British high commissioner in 
Egypt Lord Kitchener, and Foreign Office administrators in the region such as Sir Mark 
Sykes and Sir Ronald Storrs. In addition, I employ reports and essays written by these 
individuals, as well as other British officials who had close contact with the Arabist 
movement during the early twentieth century. I also look at correspondences between 
British officials and Arabist leaders contained in the British archives. These will mainly 
be used in Chapters Three and Four to analyze the relationship between the British 
government and Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during World War I. 
Some have been translated into English, some, such as the letter from the seven Syrians 
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in 1918, have not. These documents are mainly located in the British Archives with a few 
(such as the letter from the seven Syrians in original Arabic) being located at the 
American University in Cairo Library. 
In addition to British government documents, I used selected British publications. 
The most relevant of these is the Arab Bulletin. All of the issues are housed in the British 
National Archives. It is my belief that these British sources, in conjunction with the 
aforementioned Arabic-language sources provide more insight into the issues being 
examined from multiple perspectives. In other words, this combination of sources will 
not only demonstrate both how the Arabists themselves, as well as an entity outside of the 
Arabists movement perceived events. 
My sampling method consisted of analyzing a greater number of sources in years 
which bore witness to seminal events of the era. For example, the years 1908 (Young 
Turk Revolution), 1912 (massive Syrian losses in Parliamentary elections, as well 
territorial losses of Libya and the Balkans), 1914 (outbreak of World War I), 1915 
(Damascus Protocol), 1916 (start of Arab Revolt) and 1918 (end of World War I) are the 
years in which more documents are analyzed. While this does not mean that other years 
are not sufficiently examined, it is these years in which I look at the greatest number of 
periodicals and diplomatic correspondences.  
 
 
Historical Background of Syrian Immigration to Egypt 
 
 The major waves of Syrian immigration to Egypt occurred from 1850 through the 
end of the First World War.
22
 Prior to the 1850’s Syrian immigration to Egypt was not 
                                               
22 Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt. ( Stuttgart: Stiener-Verlag-Wiesbaden-GmbH, 1985): 78. 
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significant enough to warrant close attention.
23
 Prior to the census of 1917 it is difficult to 
know for certain exactly how many Syrians resided in Egypt. This is the result of the fact 
that prior to World War I Syrians were considered Ottoman subjects and thus not seen as 
foreigners.
24
 However, some indication of the growth in the Syrian population in Egypt 
can be derived from the fact that in 1899 Lord Cromer described the Syrians in Egypt as 
“constituting a very small community”25, whereas by 1917 there were 31,725 Syrians 
living in Egypt.
26
 
 Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were a variety 
of factors both pushing the Syrians out of Greater Syria, and pulling them to immigrate to 
Egypt. Between 1850 and the start of World War I roughly 250,000 Syrians opted to 
emigrate from Greater Syria.
27
 One push factor that contributed to this exodus was the 
deteriorating economic situation in Syria that was brought about by the closer integration 
of the world economic system that occurred in the nineteenth century. This led to a 
decrease in the importance of Syrian silk, long the province’s most prized agricultural 
product, as well as a decrease in the need for locally made industrial products as they 
were replaced by “cheap and better European products”.28 These factors led to the large 
scale migration of Syrian peasants and artisans beginning around 1883. 
 The motivation of the intelligentsia for emigrating from Syria differed slightly 
from that of the peasants and artisans. One push factor was the fact that the quality of the 
Syrian education system had been on the rise since the early nineteenth century. This 
                                               
23 Philipp, 71. 
24 Philipp, 78. 
25 Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt. (New York: Macmillan, 1908): 214. 
26 Egyptian Population Census of 1917. 
27 Philipp, 83. 
28 Philipp, 82 
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improved education system produced a sizable educated class that the deteriorating 
Syrian economy was incapable of absorbing.
29
 As a result of the economic situation the 
aforementioned primary occupations of the intelligentsia (i.e. jobs in bureaucracy and 
journalism) were not readily available. Therefore, if the Syrian intelligentsia hoped to 
find employment, they would have to look beyond the borders of greater Syria. 
 In addition to economic factors, political factors played a significant role in 
pushing the Syrian intelligentsia out of Greater Syria during this period. By the 1890’s 
Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II was repressing political dissenters throughout the 
empire.
30
 Individuals who openly challenged the Hamidian reforms ran the risk of being 
arrested, or worse. Numerous members of the Syrian intelligentsia had crossed 
Abdulhamid via anti-Hamidian publications.
31
 In an effort to continue their efforts to 
combat Hamidian repression, several member of this class opted to leave Greater Syria. 
 Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, emigration from Syria for 
political reasons briefly decreased. This was the result of the fact that, initially the 
Syrians, like most in the Ottoman Empire welcomed the revolution as an opportunity to 
move away from the status quo and create a more inclusive Ottoman state. However, by 
1909 it was clear the Young Turks were not going to fulfill these expectations. In the 
years that followed Young Turk repression would replace Hamidian repression as an 
incentive for emigration among the Syrian intelligentsia. This can be seen particularly 
after the Parliamentary elections of 1912.
32
  
                                               
29 Philipp, 84. 
30 Philipp, 85 
31 Specific names of these individuals will be provided throughout the body of the thesis. 
32 Details of these elections and their aftermath will be discussed in chapter two. 
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 In contrast to Greater Syria, nineteenth-century Egypt was experiencing an 
economic boom. This boom was largely due to an increased in cotton exports catalyzed 
by the American Civil War.
33
 This situation stood in stark contrast to the aforementioned 
decline of agricultural and industrial sectors in Greater Syria. As a result, Egypt became 
the primary destination for Syrian artisans and cultivators during the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century.
34
 
 In terms of the Syrian intelligentsia, economic and employment concerns were 
also key factors in their choice to immigrate to Egypt. Educated Syrians were able to find 
employment in medical, journalistic and bureaucratic sectors upon the arrival in Egypt. 
This was particularly true after the British occupied Egypt in 1882. British officials 
viewed the Syrians as the “intellectual cream of the Near East” and thus sought their 
services in administrative positions.  
 In addition to increased job opportunities, the British occupation of 1882 also 
politically motivated the Syrian intelligentsia to immigrate to Egypt. The British 
occupation limited the ability of Abdulhamid, and later the Young Turks, to persecute 
those who dissented with their regimes. Under the protection of the British in Egypt 
members of the Syrians intelligentsia were able to publish anti-Abdulhamid/Young Turk 
material without fear of repercussions. The leniency of the British with regard to political 
dissention led members of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to describe the British rule as 
“tolerant and fair” through the first years of World War I.35 
 In terms of ideology, it should be noted that Arabism was not the universal 
ideology adopted by the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. In fact, some notable members of 
                                               
33 Philipp, 82. 
34 Philipp, 82. 
35 Tauber, 80. 
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this group, such as journalist Farah Antun were staunchly opposed to Arabism on the 
grounds that this ideology would only further the gulf between the Syrian community in 
Egypt and the Egyptian population.
36
 For Antun and other like minded individuals the 
safest path was to attempt to incorporate themselves into the Egyptian Nationalist 
movement.
37
 Thus, although this thesis focuses primarily on Arabist members of the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo, it is important to keep in mind that Arabist ideology was 
not a monolithic one among this group. 
 
Socio-occupational Position of the Syrian Intelligentsia in Egypt 
 After the British occupation began in 1882, the Syrians rapidly began their 
ascension as one of the country’s most influential minorities. Two arenas in which their 
significance is most readily observed were the press and government administration. It 
was these two professions (particularly the press) that would produce the individuals 
whom would emerge as leaders of the Arabist movement in Cairo. 
 The era from 1882 to 1908 was a time when “the Egyptian press came into its 
own”.38 This was due in large part to the relaxed press restrictions put in place by Lord 
Cromer and other British officials. During this period 604 periodicals were founded in 
Cairo and Alexandria alone.
39
 The Syrian community within Egypt played an active role 
in this journalistic upsurge. For example, of the 790 newspapers and magazines 
established in all of Egypt during this time, roughly one fifth of them were established by 
                                               
36 Donald Reid, The Odyssey of Farah Antun. (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1975): 104. 
37 Reid, 108. 
38 Philipp, 97.  
39 Philipp, 97. 
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“men whose names were recognizably Syrian”.40 Among these individuals were Rashid 
Rida and Muhammad Kurd Ali who are of vital importance to this study. In addition, 
Syrians were also responsible for roughly 15% of the new periodicals that emerged in this 
era.
41
 These publications founded by the Syrians included “some of the most important 
early newspapers and periodicals” such as al-Ahram and al-Manar.42 For the purpose of 
the study al-Manar is particularly important due to the fact that many of the leading 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo frequently published in this periodical.
43
 
 In terms of bureaucratic employment, the early twentieth century was an era when 
Syrians were presented with increased opportunities. This greater demand for Syrians in 
government administration was in part due to “the shift from Turkish to Arabic in 
administrative language and the rapid expansion of the administration itself”.44 In 
addition, the aforementioned quality of the Syrian education system led to the Syrians 
being more qualified to hold administrative positions in the eyes of the British. The result 
of these reforms was the number of Syrians holding Egyptian government positions 
increasing from 690 in 1896 to 1,252 in 1906.
45
 An even more staggering statistic can be 
seen when analyzing the number of Syrians holding high-level government posts. As of 
1905, 30% of high level government positions were held by Syrians or Armenians while 
only 28% were held by Egyptians.
46
 In fact, Lord Cromer was so notorious for hiring 
Syrian bureaucrats that his successors made mention of the fact that they should avoid 
                                               
40 Philipp., 98. 
41 Philipp, 98. 
42 Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2005): 28. 
43 This periodical, as well as its contributors, will be discussed at length in chapter one. 
44 Philipp, 98. 
45 Philipp, 100. 
46 Philipp, 100. 
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placing to many Syrians in high level positions since Cromer’s high number of Syrian 
advisers led to mistrust among the Egyptian population.
47
 
 The relatively high professional status of the Syrian intelligentsia led to a certain 
amount of resentment among Egyptian nationalists. The fact that Syrians held such 
privileged positions in the state apparatus spurred “feelings of dislike” and mistrust 
among segments of Egyptian society.
48
 One reason for this is the fact that many Egyptian 
Nationalists “resented Syrian competition for posts in the administration”.49 These 
feelings of distrust and suspicion would remain present in the relationship between 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo and the Egyptian nationalists. In order to 
fully comprehend the where to situate the Arabist movement within the broader 
nationalist current present in Egypt during this period, a closer analysis of this dichotomy 
is necessary.  
 
Syrian Arabist Relations with the Egyptian Nationalists 
Though the first significant encounters between these two movements occurred 
around 1900, it was during the years between 1908 and 1914 that a major gulf began to 
emerge between the two movements.
50
 This gulf evolved largely as a result of the 
movements’ divergent ideological orientations and political trajectories.51 On the most 
basic level these contrary trajectories were the product of the politics and identity of the 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo being largely shaped by their sense of 
                                               
47 PRO 30/57/44, “Lord Kitchener in Egypt”, December, 1913, 1.  
48 PRO 30/57/44, 1913,1. 
49 Baron, 28. 
50 James Jankowski, “Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism”, in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Khalidi, 
Rashid, Anderson, Lisa, Muslih, Mohammad and Simon, Reeva S. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993): 245-246. This was largely due to the increased adherence to both movements in the wake of events 
such as Dinshawai (1906) and the Young Turk Revolution (1908). 
51 Jankowski, 245. 
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Arab identity while the Egyptian nationalist movement was void of this component.
52
 At 
best, the Egyptian nationalist movement viewed the Arabs as tolerable only on religious 
grounds.
53
 
Throughout World War I the Egyptian nationalist movement remained “entirely 
apathetic to the Arab movement for independence”.54 In the view of many Egyptian 
nationalists the Arabs were incapable of making use of independence in the event that the 
Revolt in the Desert succeeded.
55
 Given that Cairo was by this time the location of 
several of the more active Syrian Arabists, these attitudes resulted in a war of propaganda 
between the two movements, which is discussed in chapter three.
56
 According to British 
sources, despite the significant number of Syrian-run journals, newspapers and 
periodicals in Egypt the Syrians in Cairo struggled to counter the large amounts of 
“insidious propaganda” produced by the Egyptian nationalists.57 Although it its is true 
that British sources should in this case be taken with a grain of salt, the letters and 
newspaper clippings produced in these sources indicate that there were indeed tensions 
between these two movements.
58
 
In addition to ideological divergences related to Arab identity, there were other 
factors that contributed to wartime tensions between the Egyptian nationalists and Syrian 
Arabists based within Cairo. First of all, within the Egyptian nationalist movement there 
                                               
52 Jankowski, 244. 
53 CAB 24/34 “Memorandum from E.S. Montagu to Sir Hankey”, November 17, 1917, 192. 
54 FO 141/783 High Commission Report, “Egypt and the Arab Movement”, August 16, 1917, 2. 
55 FO 141/783, 3. 
56 The exact members present in Egypt, as well as their war-time activities will be discussed in detail 
chapter four. 
57 FO 141/783, 3. 
58 The grain of salt comment relates largely to the fact that it would have been in British interests to portray 
this movements as in conflict.  
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existed a small but powerful minority of Egyptians of Turkish descent.
59
 Not surprisingly, 
these individuals continued to feel contacted to the Ottoman Empire and as such resented 
Arab efforts to break away from it.
60
 In addition, some Egyptian nationalists who were 
not of Turkish decent also had reason to wish the British had chosen to support the 
Ottomans over the Arabs.
61
 This was largely due to the fact that many Egyptian 
nationalists still perceived the “Sultan of Turkey” as the Khalifa of Islam and thus felt 
that being submissive to the Ottoman Sultan was akin to being submissive to the Islamic 
Caliphate.
62
 
 In addition to pro-Ottoman sentiments, anti-British sentiments also played a 
significant role in shaping Egyptian nationalist perceptions of the Arab movement. By the 
start of World War I the Egyptian nationalist movement was strongly anti-British.
63
 
Egyptian nationalists viewed the British occupation as an illegal and illegitimate 
occupation that had put Egypt in a worse position than when it was under Ottoman 
control.
64
 Given these attitudes, the fact that Arabists in general, and particularly those 
within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo were actively cooperating with the British late 
into World War I did not help shrink the gulf between the two movements. 
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Chapter Outline 
The following thesis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter one will analyze 
the development of Arabism among the Syrians intelligentsia in Cairo. Key in this 
chapter is the examination of the ideological differences among Arabists within this 
group. In addition, this chapter examines of the factors that catalyzed cooperation among 
Arabists with differing ideologies. Chapter Two will examine Cairo’s transformation into 
a center of Arabism in the era from 1908-1914. The major component of this chapter is 
an examination of the development, nature and activities of Arabist societies in Cairo. 
Chapter Three will examine the activities of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during the 
war years (1914-1918). The critical aspect of this chapter is an analyses of the extent to 
which the Syrian Arabists in Cairo were connected to the broader Arab independence 
effort (the Revolt in the Desert), as well a broader analysis of this group’s contributions 
to the allied war effort. Chapter Three will contain comparative analysis of Cairo vis-à-
vis Damascus. 
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Catalyzing Cooperation: An Analysis of Arabism within the Syrian 
Intelligentsia in Cairo from 1900-1914. 
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Introduction 
 
 The following chapter will examine the ideological orientation and interactions 
between Arabists within Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo between 1900 and 1914. The 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo provides a particularly interesting case study in terms of   
cooperation among Arabists of different ideological orientations in the years leading up 
to, and including World War I. In contrast to the societies in the more frequently 
analyzed Arabist hotbed of Damascus, Arabist societies in Cairo contained a significant 
percentage of individuals with different ideological conceptions of Arabism.
65
 In 
addition, these comparatively diverse Arabist societies in Cairo were among the most 
significant in existence in the years following 1908.  
 This chapter argues that, although a homogenous version of Arabism never 
emerged, cooperation between Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo increased 
dramatically between the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the First World 
War. In addition, the following work will challenge the dominant paradigm in existing 
scholarship that rigidly categorizes Muslim and Christian Arabists. This categorization 
has prevented analysis of the internal divergences within each of these entities. It is my 
aim to deconstruct the notion that one can classify ideological conflicts within the Arabist 
movement as being exclusively along religious lines. Instead, this study sets out to adopt 
a more nuanced approach and discuss the different ideological interpretations present 
within these groups. For reasons of source accessibility as well as prevalence of existing 
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material, this study will be heavily focused on the differing ideological conceptions of 
Arabism found among Muslim Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. 
There are four specific questions that guide my research: How do the individuals 
within the Syrian intelligentsia perceive Arabist ideology? What are the ideological 
divergences within this community? What events catalyzed cooperation between Arabists 
within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo? Does a homogenous version of Arabism develop 
within this community? 
The aim of this chapter is to challenge two assumptions that are prevalent in much 
of the scholarship regarding Arabism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 
The first paradigm that is challenged in this study is the aforementioned notion that 
Christian Arabists and Muslim Arabists should be seen as two distinct but homogeneous 
entities (one religious (Muslim) the other secular (Christian)). As has been mentioned, 
this will be proven largely by de-essentializing the notion of a homogenous Muslim 
Arabism. The second paradigm that is challenged in this study will be the idea that the 
increased cooperation between Arabists during this era was the result of the development 
of a homogeneous Arabist ideology.
66
 This study deconstructs this fallacy by examining 
alternative factors (e.g. Hamidian repression, Young Turk Turkification polices, and the 
loss of territory in 1912) that explain this development.  
The following study is divided into four sections. The first section will examine 
the existing scholarship regarding the ideological orientations of Syrian Arabists within 
the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. The second section will explore two early ideologues 
often cited as establishing the Christian and Muslim versions of Arabism. The third 
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section will examine the ideological orientations of four prominent Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo from 1900 through 1914. The final section will examine the 
circumstances that catalyzed cooperation between Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo.  
Historiography 
Much of the early scholarship regarding Arabist ideology in the early twentieth 
century has cited religion as the primary lens through which ideological orientations 
within the Arabist movement should be viewed.
67
 Prevalent in this scholarship is the 
assertion that Christian Arabists formed one distinct group while Muslim Arabists formed 
another.
68
 Scholars such as Zeine N. Zeine, Ernest Dawn and Albert Hourani explicitly 
speak of the existence of “Christian” and “Muslim” versions of Arabism.69  Thus, 
according to these narratives understanding an Arabist’s religious orientations was 
sufficient for understanding their interpretation of Arabism.  
 In addition to propagating religion as a lens through which to understand Arabist 
ideological orientations, the aforementioned scholarship also promotes religion as the 
lens through which to understand conflict within the Arabist movement. This narrative 
suggests that, prior to 1914; the Christian and Muslim ideological versions of Arabism 
were inherently hostile toward one another.
70
 According to this school of thought 
Christian Arabists during this period were concerned with establishing a single, secular 
Arab state where Christians and Muslims would be equal
71
 while Muslim Arabists were 
                                               
67 See Albert Hourani Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (1962), Zeine N. Zeine The Emergence of Arab 
Nationalism (1966) and C. Ernest Dawn From Ottomanism to Arabism (1973). 
68 Zeine, 61. 
69 See Dawn, 132-133, Zeine, 61 and Hourani, 271-277. 
70 See Zeine, 69-70 and Dawn 132-133. 
71 Hourani, 278 
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concerned with establishing an Arab state based on the principles and practices of the 
seventh-century Islamic community.
72
 Problematic in this paradigm is the fact that the 
propagation of the Christian/Muslim divide as a definitive split that can be blamed for 
ideological divergences within the movement precludes examination of significant 
divergences within each community.
73
 
 For proponents of this paradigm, increased interaction between ideologically 
differing Arabists coincides with the birth of a homogeneous version of Arabist ideology 
around the onset of World War I.
74
 Since proponents of this paradigm see Christian and 
Muslim Arabists as two distinct homogenous entities, any sign of ideological cohesion 
between members of these groups can be taken as a evidence a homogeneous version of 
Arabism.
75
 There are two major problems with this line of thinking. First of all, the 
problem of the Christian vs. Muslim divide being portrayed as the most significant gap to 
be bridged is omnipresent in this assertion. Secondly, this line of thinking ignores 
writings of members of the movement that continue to reflect different ideological 
interpretations of Arabism well beyond World War I. Thus, the current study will diverge 
from this line of thought in two distinct ways. First, it will refrain from using religion as 
the definitive category for understanding ideological orientations and conflicts within the 
early twentieth century Arabist movement. Secondly, this study will not conflate 
increased cooperation and the homogeneity of Arabist ideology.  
                                               
72 Zeine, 69. 
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 Within the last twenty years scholarship has emerged that challenges notions of 
homogeneity within the early twentieth-century Arabist movement.
76
 It argues that the 
Arabist movement never produced a comprehensive theory of Arabism during this 
period.
77
 In other words, these scholars propagate the notion that a homogenous version 
of Arabism did not emerge during the period of pre-World War I or World War I periods. 
In addition, scholars promoting this paradigm take a more nuanced approach to the 
examination of ideological differences within the early twentieth century Arabist 
movement.
78
 Specifically relevant to this to study is the fact that these scholars are 
cognizant of internal divides within the Christian and Muslim Arabists.  
 Though this study will use the paradigm propagated by Duri, Tauber and Gelvin 
as a point of embarkation, the following research differs from these studies in that it will 
examine a very specific case study (the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo) that is under 
analyzed in the aforementioned works. The studies conducted by both Duri and Tauber 
attempt to analyze such a high quantity of individuals and locations that no single group 
is analyzed in depth.
79
 For his part, Gelvin’s study focuses exclusively on Syria, as well 
as on an historical period (1918-1920) that falls outside the scope of this study. The 
following study seeks to contribute to the existing scholarship by using the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo as a lens into the ideological orientations and activities of the 
nascent Arabist movement. 
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Early Ideologues 
 One of the earliest members of the Syrian intelligentsia in Egypt to espouse a 
politicized version of Arabism was Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi.
80
 Kawakabi was a 
Muslim who was originally from Aleppo and immigrated to Cairo in 1898 after his 
journalistic activities provoked ire from the Turkish authorities.
81
 It was from Cairo that 
he was able to produce writings advocating the establishment of an Arab state without 
facing the oppression of the Hamidian government. It is through his publications 
produced during his years in Cairo (1898-1903) that one can gain a sense of Kawakabi’s 
ideological conceptions of Arabism.  
 For Kawakabi, the return of the Arabs to a position of prominence required a 
return to the true Islam of the early Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula.
82
 In Kawakabi’s view 
the decline of Arab society was the result of the Ottoman sultans departing from the 
version of Islam adopted by the early Arabs.
83
 Given Kawakabi’s juxtaposition of Arab 
revival and a return to Islamic purity; it is not entirely surprising that Kawakabi suggests 
that it is the Arabs of Arabia that should take the lead in this process.
84
 This was part and 
parcel of Kawakabi’s notion that the Arabian Arab’s closeness to Islam made them 
superior to others in the Arab world.
85
 Thus, for Kawakabi, the revival of Arab society 
was necessarily linked to a return to the Islamic principles that had guided the Arabs of 
the seventh-century Arabian Peninsula. 
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 It was Kawakabi’s diagnosis that Islamic revival would act as the catalyst for 
unifying Arabs of all religions under a single banner. In his view, Islam in its pure form 
was a progressive system that promoted freedom and justice.
86
 It was Islam that allowed 
the Arabs to precede other societies in adopting principles of equality and social 
welfare.
87
 As a result of these beliefs, Kawakabi asserted that a return to pure Islam was 
capable of catalyzing unification among people of all the Eastern religions.
88
 What is 
evident here is that in Kawakabi’s ideological conception Arab unity could not exist 
without Islam.  
 Another prominent Arabist within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo in the years 
prior to 1908 was Nagib Azoury. Azoury was from a Syrian Christian background and 
immigrated to Cairo in 1906 after a brief stint in Paris from 1904-1906.
89
 Azoury was 
among the first Arabists to advocate Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire.
90
 
Though Azoury is often cited as establishing a distinctly Christian version of political 
Arabism,
91
 some of his ideological principles are also present in the writings of Muslim 
Arabists.
92
 
 Contrary to Kawakabi’s view of Islam being the necessary catalyst for Arab unity, 
Azoury envisioned an Arab state where civil and religious power would be separated.
93
 
According to Azoury, this separation would be in the best interests of both Arabs and 
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Muslims.
94
 Azoury’s ultimate goal was the establishment of an Arab state that would be 
governed by a “constitutional sultanate” and based on “freedom of all religions and 
equality of all citizens before the law”.95 While Kawakabi also spoke of freedom and 
equality it is important to make the distinction that in his view Islam acted as the catalyst 
for these principles.  
 Despite his desire to separate Islam from the official Arab state, Azoury does 
appear cognizant of the important connection between Islam and Arab history. Azoury’s 
solution is to establish a politically independent Muslim Arab caliphate in the Hijaz 
region.
96
 This caliphate would be governed by the Sherif of Mecca and “hold a real moral 
authority over all the Muslims of the world.”97 His rationale for limiting the political 
authority of the caliph to the Hijaz was his belief that attempts to use Islam as a bond for 
establishing a single Muslim state had failed since the earliest days of Islam.
98
 Thus, in 
Azoury’s view Islam did not represent the ideal catalyst for bringing about Arab 
unification. 
 Though Kawakabi and Azoury are of great importance to the study of the early 
twentieth-century Arabist movement, the tendency to view these individuals as 
representing separate Muslim and Christian versions of political Arabism is 
problematic.
99
 While there are certainly examples within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
of Muslims echoing Kawakabi’s sentiments and Christians propagating Azoury’s 
theories, there are some significant exceptions to this rule. It is through the analysis of 
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other Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo that the problem of using these 
two ideologues as representatives of homogenous Muslim/Christian Arabist ideologies 
becomes apparent.  
Ideological Interpretations 
 One of the most well-known Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
throughout the early twentieth century was Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Rida. Rida 
emigrated from Syria to Cairo in 1897 and quickly entered the sphere of publishing.
100
 
His periodical Al-Manar was founded in 1898 and quickly became a forum for many of 
the leading Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo.
101
 While Rida was willing 
on some level to acknowledge the importance of nationalisms based on linguistic and 
ethnic ties, it was Islam that Rida viewed as “a kind of supernationalism, the only true 
nationalism for Muslims.”102 
 Like Kawakabi, Rashid Rida juxtaposed Islamic revival and Arab revival.
103
 In 
Rida’s view it was the departure from pure Islam that had led to the Ottoman Empire 
becoming subservient to the European powers.
104
 Rida’s solution to this problem was the 
establishment of an Islamic caliphate that governed based on the general principles of the 
past history of Islam.
105
  In terms of the principles guiding the caliphate, Rida supported 
the aforementioned concept developed by Kawakabi.
106
 Part of this conception was the 
idea that Islamic restoration and Arab revival were part and parcel of one another.
107
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 Though he perceived Islamic and Arab revivals as being inexorably linked, 
Rashid Rida recognized the potential importance of modern nationalisms based on ideas 
of a shared language and homeland.
108
 Rida described these bonds as a “union of the 
inhabitants of a homeland who cooperate in preserving their independence and increasing 
their prosperity.”109 For Rida, this ideology is compatible with Islam in that Islamic 
teachings promoted the cooperation of Muslims and non-Muslims to defend a country 
and preserve its independence and prosperity.
110
 Despite this, Rida’s tendency to conflate 
Islam and Arabism was never far from the surface. This is evidenced by the fact that all 
initiates in to his Society of the Arab Association established in 1911 were required to 
recite the following oath:  
I swear by Allah, the mighty, the victorious, the vengeful, the great, who knows my 
secret and reveled, who can negate all the talents and strengths that were given to me, and 
by the glorious book of Allah, that I will put all my effort to bring the cooperation of the 
Arabs, the unity of their leaders and the founding of a new kingdom according to the 
principles determined by the Society of the Arab association that I am joining today.” 111 
 
Thus, while the Society of the Arab Association was ostensibly a society promoting 
equality for all Arabs regardless of religious affiliations, the Islamic ideological overtones 
in the preceding oath are hardly subtle.  
Though similar in some respects to Kawakabi and Rida, Muhammad Kurd Ali 
represents an example of a Muslim Arabist with a slightly different view of the 
relationship between Islam and Arabism. Kurd Ali emigrated from Damascus to Cairo in 
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1901 for professional reasons.
112
 Like Kawakabi and Rida, Kurd Ali believed that the era 
of early Islam was an era of freedom and progress and that the Ottoman sultans’ 
departure from pure Islam had led to the decline of Arab society.
113
 Kurd Ali was also in 
agreement with Rida and Kawakabi that the Arabs had historically controlled their own 
destiny and deserved to do so again.
114
 However, Kurd Ali differed slightly from Rida 
and significantly from Kawakabi in his suggestions for how to return the Arabs to their 
place of prominence. 
 In Kurd Ali’s view, Arab revival was best catalyzed through a fusion of the past 
and present.
115
  While Kurd Ali believed that the principles of early Islam supplied the 
foundation for Arab revival
116
, he also believed that religion alone could not catalyze 
Arab unity.
117
 In Kurd Ali’s view, the revival of education and Arabic literature were also 
key components of bringing Arabs of various backgrounds together.
118
 Part and parcel of 
the educational revival was a renewed focus on the teaching of standard Arabic, which 
Kurd Ali viewed as superior to all other languages including local Arabic dialects.
119
  
Thus, for Kurd Ali a return to pure Islam was only one component of Arabism. Though 
he points to pure Islam as the foundation for unity, his notion that literature, education 
and knowledge are essential for the Arabs to reclaim their place of prominence
120
 
                                               
112 Kurd Ali was a journalist and during the Hamidian period Egypt offered far more journalistic freedom 
than other areas of the Empire. See Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt. 
113 Muhammad Kurd Ali, al-Islam wa al-hadarah al-Arabiyah, (Cairo: Maṭba’at Lajnat al-Talīf wa-al-
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represents a discrepancy between his ideology and that of more conservative Muslim 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo.
121
  
 While Kurd Ali differed with Kawakabi on the relationship between Islam and 
Arab unification, other Muslim Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo were far 
more skeptical of the ability of Islam to unify the Arab people. Two of the more 
significant examples of this are Rafiq and Haqqi Azm. Both were originally from the 
notable Azm family of Damascus. These two individuals, Rafiq in particular, were 
among the more influential Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo in the years 
leading up to World War I. 
 Throughout the years of 1900-1914 Rafiq Azm was involved in several Arabist 
societies in Cairo.
122
 Most notably, he served as the President of the Decentralization 
Society. This society was characterized by A.A. Duri as one of the most influential 
Arabist reform movements in the pre-war era.
123
 It should be noted that Rafiq Azm 
shared Kawakabi, Rida and Kurd Ali’s veneration for early Islamic practices and 
leadership.
124
 He was in agreement with the assertion that the era of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs was an era in which democracy, freedom and justice were promoted.
125
 Despite 
his reverence for this period, Rafiq Azm did not see religion as a bond capable of uniting 
the Arabs. 
 Azm’s rationale for looking beyond Islam for sources of Arab unification related 
in large part to his view that Islamic unity had traditionally been hard to achieve.
126
 In 
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Azm’s view, this was reflected by the fact that historically Islam had failed to catalyze 
cooperation among Muslims even in cases where Muslim lands had been attacked by 
external forces (i.e. Crusades and Mongol invasion).
127
 Azm’s alternative in terms of 
unifying the Arabs was to focus on the bonds of nationalism and language.
128
 For Azm, it 
was these bonds that “had the potential of uniting the Arabs, irrespective of their 
religions.
129
 
 Like his cousin Rafiq, Haqqi Azm looked beyond Islam for bonds among the 
Arab nation. Also a member of the Decentralization Society, Haqqi Azm sought to ensure 
that religion did not bar Arabs of various religious backgrounds from obtaining 
membership in the society.
130
 In Azm’s view, linguistic and ethnic ties superseded 
religious affiliations. These feelings can be seen in a letter composed in 1913 in which 
Haqqi Azm stated that failing to accept Christians as equal members of the 
Decentralization Society was ignorant.
131
 This letter was composed in response to the 
increasing problem of branch leaders refusing to allow religious minorities into the 
society.
132
  What is significant here is that, like Rafiq, Haqqi Azm stresses language and 
nationality as unifying bonds that superseded religious affiliations.
133
  
 What can be derived from the analysis of the ideological orientations of Arabists 
within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo is the fact that discussing ideological divergences 
strictly within the framework of Christian vs. Muslim is deeply flawed. As this section 
has demonstrated, important Muslim members of this group have much in common with 
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the Christian Azoury in terms of their conceptions of Arabism. By establishing that one 
cannot speak of two distinct, homogeneous versions of Arabism it becomes harder to 
assert that the conflation of “Christian” and “Muslim” ideology occurs at the start of 
World War I. What the writings of the aforementioned individuals demonstrate is that a 
homogenous Muslim version of Arabism did not develop during this period. Thus, in 
order to explain the cooperation among Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
from 1900-1914 it is essential to explore the social and political factors that created 
common interests among these individuals. 
 
Catalyzing Cooperation 
 In the years prior to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 cooperation among 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo was catalyzed in large part by the 
oppressive regime of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1908). Much of the 
commentary in the preceding section regarding the need to establish an Arab caliphate 
based on early Islamic principles was in reaction to the policies of Abdulhamid. While it 
should be noted that some members of this group did feel Abdulhamid’s emphasis on 
religion was not entirely negative
134
, he was not seen as the correct individual to hold the 
position of caliph. In the words of Rashid Rida, “the Ottoman (Hamidian) caliphate could 
be accepted then as a caliphate of necessity, but it was not a real caliphate.
135
 It was this 
line of thinking that led to the more religious Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo like Kawakabi, Rida and to some degree Kurd Ali to reject the idea of Abdulhamid 
continuing to hold the title of caliph.  
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 In addition to alienating more religious Muslim Arabists, less religious Muslims 
and Christians had abundant cause to be dissatisfied with Abdulhamid. In the Christian 
context, the fact that Abdulhamid’s focus on Islam was the key component of 
Ottomanism necessarily placed Christians in an inferior position.
136
 In terms of the more 
secular Muslims within this community, mention has been made in previous sections of 
the fact that fear of Hamidian persecution was a key factor that led many of these 
individuals to emigrate from Syria to Cairo.
137
  
 Evidence of anti-Hamidian sentiments catalyzing cooperation among Arabists 
within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo can be found through the analysis of the Society 
of the Ottoman Council established in Cairo in 1907.
138
 The founding of the society was 
the result of collaboration between Rashid Rida and Rafiq Azm (Muhammad Kurd Ali 
was also a member).
139
 The stated aim of this society was to apply the strongest possible 
efforts toward combating the tyranny of Abdulhamid.
140
 The end goal was the 
establishment of a constitutional/parliamentary Ottoman state that respected the rights of 
all individuals regardless of religion or nationality.
141
 Thus, this society serves as a fine 
example of ideologically heterogeneous Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
coming together based on common socio-political aims. 
 In the years following the Young Turk revolution Arabist activity within the 
Ottoman Empire increased significantly. It was during this era that British diplomat A.T. 
Wilson describes “a period of rapid growth” for the Syrian Arabist movement that 
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resulted in a “mushroom crop of patriotic organizations.”142 Though the initial reactions 
to the revolution were largely positive among Arabs throughout the empire
143
, over time 
anti-Young Turk sentiments would serve as the primary factor unifying Ottoman 
Arabs.
144
 
In the immediate wake of the revolution the majority of Arabists would have 
shared Rashid Rida’s view that “(on the day of the Young Turk Revolution) the Ottomans 
tasted the sweetness of liberty, the difference between the past and present in the 
difference between night and day.”145 Rafiq and Haqqi Azm even accepted positions in 
the Young Turk bureaucracy.
146
 However, as a result of the Young Turk polices of 
“Turcification” based on the principles of “not any nationalism but Ottoman Turk, not 
any official language but Turkish, not any home rule within the empire, not any of the 
higher power in other hands than those that subscribed to its program of one race, one 
language, one administration” the amenable attitudes of Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia toward the Young Turks had almost completely evaporated by the onset of 
World War I.
147
 It is in this context that one can observe an increasing amount of 
cooperation among ideologically divergent Arabists of both religions.  
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Cooperation among the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during this period largely 
manifested itself in the form of Arabist societies.
148
 While it is impossible to determine 
exactly how many individuals were involved in these societies (or the broader Arabist 
movement during this period) there is evidence suggesting that the Arabist societies in 
Cairo were influential.
149
 The majority of these societies exerted influence for relatively 
short periods of time, however there is a pattern that can be seen where by as soon as one 
society is dissolved another is formed by the same individuals who were active in the 
previous society.
150
    
While societies such as the aforementioned Society of the Ottoman Council were 
established by the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo prior to 1908, it was during the period of 
1908-1914 that a significant increase in the establishment of these societies can be 
observed.
151
 It has already been noted that these societies were comparatively 
ideologically diverse. Many of them contained some or all of the Muslim Arabists 
discussed in the previous section.
152
 By and large the common thread among all of these 
societies was the idea that as a result of the Young Turk’s failure to establish an inclusive 
Ottoman state, the Arabs needed to unite to achieve increased autonomy.
153
  
Dissatisfaction with the Young Turks manifested itself differently in the various 
societies. For example, Rashid Rida described the mission of his Society of the Arab 
Association as creating a union between the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula and the 
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Arabs of other Ottoman provinces against the Young Turks
154
 whose evil plots made 
them the enemies of the Arabs and Islam.
155
 Similar language can be found in the 1913 
“Proclamation to the Arabs, Sons of Qahtan” issued by the Arab Revolutionary Society in 
which Haqqi Azm was deeply involved.
156
 This pamphlet called on Muslim, Jewish and 
Christian Arabs to set aside their religious differences and “cleanse their country” of the 
oppressive tyranny of those (i.e. the Young Turks) who show enmity toward the Arab 
race and language.
157
 Thus, for these societies it was hostility toward the Young Turks’ 
policies of Turkification that served to unite Arabists of divergent ideological 
orientations. 
The Decentralization Party, a society in which Rida, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Rafiq 
Azm and Haqqi Azm were members, had a slightly different platform than those of the 
two aforementioned societies. Though the failures of the Young Turk government served 
as the unifying thread
158, the Decentralization Party’s main concerns had less to do with 
Turcification and more to do with fear of territorial loss.
159
 The fact that by 1912 the 
Young Turks had ceded Libya to Italy and were on the brink of losing the Balkans led 
members within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to fear that the Young Turks lacked the 
resources and power to prevent Arab land from falling under imperial control.
160
 In their 
manifesto the Decentralization Party asserts that the best way to combat this potential 
loss of territory was to create a decentralized Ottoman system in which the Arabs, as well 
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as other ethnic groups, would gain increased autonomy.
161
 Thus while frustration with 
Turcification policies was present within this group
162
, it was the fear that the Young 
Turks were too weak to protect Ottoman-Arab interests that acted as the principal factor 
for unifying this society. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The years of 1900-1914 did not witness the birth of a homogeneous version of 
Arabism among the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. The analysis provided in this study has 
demonstrated that even within communities that have been suggested to be ideologically 
homogeneous (in this case the Muslim Arabists) significant ideological divergences were 
present. Thus, when considering the circumstances that catalyzed increased cooperation 
between Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during this period it is 
imperative to first move beyond the notion of the development of a homogenous version 
of Arabism. 
 Increased cooperation among Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
during this period was the result of common interests being created by socio-political 
realities. This can be observed prior to 1908 via analysis of Arabists societies that cited 
combating Hamidian repression as their primary aim. In the years following the Young 
Turk revolution cooperation among ideologically divergent Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo increased dramatically. As the analysis has shown, this cooperation 
had little to do with an ideologically homogenous version of Arabism. Cooperation seen 
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in the societies mentioned in the preceding section was the result of an increasingly 
negative attitude among Arabs of different ideological orientations toward the Young 
Turk government.  Whether it was dissatisfaction with Turcification policies, or fears that 
the government was no longer strong enough to protect Arab territory, dissatisfaction 
with the Young Turk government served to unite Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo despite their ideological differences. 
 In addition to providing insight into the activities and ideological orientations of 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo, the preceding study should be situated 
with the broader debate regarding Arabism in the early twentieth century. De-
esssentializing the notion that Christian and Muslim Arabists can be rigidly classified as 
two separate, ideologically homogenous groups is a methodological approach that can be 
applied to the study of the broader Arabist movement during this period. It is by moving 
beyond notions of ideological homogeneity that one can understand the socio-political 
factors that catalyzed increased cooperation among Arabists in the years of 1900-1914. 
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Cairo as a Political Center of the Arabist Movement: 1908-1914 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the process by which the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
transformed Cairo into in an epicenter of the Arabist movement. Although an analysis of 
subsequent years is extremely useful in terms of demonstrating this assertion, this study 
will present the years 1908-1914 as the period in which Cairo developed in to an 
epicenter of the Arabist movement. Despite the fact that by 1912 many prominent 
Damascus Arabists had immigrated to Cairo there is a limited amount of literature 
available describing Cairo’s place in the Arabist movement. Likewise, a detailed study of 
the Syrian intelligentsia’s role in catalyzing Cairo’s development as an epicenter of the 
movement is noticeably absent from the existing scholarship.  
As has been mentioned in chapter two, the development of Arabist societies was 
one of the most significant external manifestations of Arabist ideology in Cairo. In the 
years leading up to World War I the Arabist societies founded in Cairo were among the 
most influential in existence.
163
 Several of these societies were closely connected other to 
braches in areas across Greater Syria.
164
 Despite these facts scholars of tended to focus 
far more on Damascus as the movements lone epicenter during this period.
165
 As such, 
the conclusion drawn by these scholars regarding the nature and scope of early twentieth 
century Arabism are tainted by the fact that they only provide detailed analysis of one 
Arabist center. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates how the Syrian intelligentsia was 
able to develop Cairo into an epicenter of the Arabist movement that, by 1912, was on 
many levels a more significant political center than Damascus. 
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The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First of all, this chapter aims to demonstrate 
Rashid Khalidi’s assertion that centers of Arabism outside of Damascus of been under 
analyzed by scholars.
166
 This chapter aims to bridge this gap by analyzing Cairo as an 
epicenter of the movement. It is my intention that an analysis of Cairo will both justify 
Cairo’s place as an epicenter of the movement, as well as demonstrate the utility of 
examining areas outside of Damascus to obtain a broader understanding of the Arabist 
movement during this period. 
The second aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that it was the activities of the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo that catalyzed Cairo’s development into an epicenter of the 
Arabist movement. It was within this group that Arabist ideology was prevalent during 
this period. As has been mentioned in chapter two, many of the Syrians that immigrated 
to Cairo during this period were among the more prominent members of the Arabist 
movement.  
There are four questions to be answered this chapter: How does the Syrian 
intelligentsia catalyze Cairo’s transformation in to an epicenter of Arabism? Why should 
the Arabist societies in Cairo be viewed as influential? Is it justifiable to view Cairo as a 
center of Arabism comparable to Damascus? What are the implications of this study vis-
à-vis Khalidi’s assertion that alternative centers of Arabism must be examined to truly 
understand the size and scope of the Arabist movement in the early twentieth century? 
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Historiography 
Much of the existing scholarship regarding Arabism in the early twentieth century 
is quick to portray Damascus as the unchallenged political center of the Arabist 
movement. According to this paradigm, Damascus-based elites were the first to advocate 
Arabism.
167
 As a result of this assertion proponents of this paradigm argue for Damascus 
as “the major center of Arabism during the period of 1908-1914”.168 Although it is true 
that many of the more notable Arabist leaders were Damascenes, it is misleading to 
suggest that this resulted in Damascus as the lone center of the Arabist movement.
169
 
In From Ottomanism to Arabism Ernest Dawn provides the reader with a chart 
outlining Syrian membership in pre-1914 Arabist societies.
170
 In this chart up on which 
subsequent scholars have been heavily reliant
171
, Dawn neglects to include membership 
in societies that had its leadership centered outside of Greater Syria.
172
 Particularly 
relevant in terms of this study is the fact that membership in Cairo-based societies, 
including the Decentralization Party is noticeably absent.  
Dawn’s assessment of the number of Syrian Arabists prior to World War I is 
tainted by the fact that he seems to ignore societies in other areas. As this chapter shows, 
the incompleteness of his analysis is the result of the fact that there was a great deal of 
important activity occurring in other centers. By ignoring these centers Dawn renders his 
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work incapable of presenting an accurate picture of the size and scope of the early 
twentieth-century Arabist movement.  
Although Philip Khoury clearly that states that his book Urban Notables and Arab 
Nationalism is designed to be a case study of Damascus, his understanding of alternative 
centers is a bit more nuanced than Dawn’s.173 While Khoury argues for the significance 
of Damascus, he also seems willing to acknowledge that some of the more active Arabist 
Damascenes immigrated to Cairo by 1912.
174
 Unlike Dawn, Khoury also acknowledges 
the fact that these individuals remained active in the Arabist movement after settling in 
Cairo.
175
 The discrepancy between these two works should be seen as the result of the 
sources they examine, as well as the progression of scholarship over the decade.  
Aside from the tendency to focus heavily on Damascus, another semi problematic 
trend in scholarship on Arabism in the early twentieth century is a scholar’s tendency to 
analyze all the societies and ideologues from various centers in a single work.
176
 While 
these works represent a more nuanced attempt to convey the size and scope of the early 
twentieth-century Arabist movement, this approach is not without flaws. Problematic 
here is the fact that by trying to analyze the general development of Arabist societies 
from Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Mousl and Istanbul this scholarship provides little more 
than a brief introduction to the Arabist movement during this period.
177
 In other words, 
studies of this broad scope fail to adequately capture the nuances of any single Arabist 
center.  
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This chapter will depart from this paradigm by providing in-depth analysis of 
Cairo as an epicenter of Arabism. It should be noted that this chapter does not intend to 
replicate the implicit arguments of scholars of the first paradigm that understanding one 
Arabist center provides sufficient insight into the size and scope of the movement. 
Instead, this chapter argues that in-depth understanding of Cairo can be used as a piece of 
a larger puzzle that reveals the picture of Arabism during this period.
178
  
 
Cairo’s Development as an Epicenter of Arabism 
As dissatisfaction with the Young Turk regime grew in the years following the 
revolution of 1908 an increasing number of Arabist societies began to emerge throughout 
the Ottoman Empire.
179
 Since it was the Syrians that served as the “intellectual and 
organizing power” of the Arabist movement during this era, it is not surprising that the 
vast majority of these societies were established by individuals from Greater Syria.
180
 As 
a result, as time went on the Young Turk government increasingly sought to stamp out 
Arab nationalist currents within the borders of Greater Syria.
181
 Thus, it was from 
alternative areas that Syrian Arabist leaders would mitigate to continue their battle with 
the Young Turks.
182
 
In addition to the factors for emigration from Greater Syria detailed in the 
introduction and chapter one, the parliamentary elections of 1912 must be discussed here 
in order to understand Cairo’s transformation into an epicenter of Arabism. It was these 
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elections that compelled several politicized Arabists to emigrate from Damascus to 
Cairo.
183
 Furthermore, the outcome of the 1912 elections appear to have increased the 
number of individuals in Greater Syria willing to collaborate with Cairo-based Arabist 
leadership.
184
 This fact combined with an increasing number of politicized Arabist 
émigrés provided the pre-existing Syrian Arabist community within Cairo with an 
increased ability to expand their influence throughout the intellectual circles of Greater 
Syria.
185
 
The Parliamentary Elections of 1912 witnessed a significant loss of parliamentary 
seats for those Syrians who adopted an Arabist agenda in opposition to the Young Turks. 
Only three out of the hitherto twenty-one Syrian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament were 
re-elected in 1912.
186
 Furthermore, the three individuals who were re-elected were known 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) collaborators.
187
 As has been mentioned, a 
significant portion of Syrians who did not get re-elected had known Arabist sympathies. 
Despite the fact that the ambitions of these individuals were at this point were “without a 
thought of separatism” from the empire, the Young Turk regime still opted to attempt to 
stifle Arabist representation in the Ottoman parliament.
188
 
The fact that Arabs within the Ottoman Empire were able to gain parliament seats 
only through collaboration with the CUP is useful in debunking the idea that the elections 
of 1912 should not be seen as a pivotal moment in the pre-War Arabist movement. 
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Scholars such as Feroz Ahmed have cited the fact that there were more Arabs in 
parliament in 1912 than 1908 as rationale for devaluing the 1912 elections as a turning 
point for the Arabist movement.
189
 In reality, the Arabs that held on to their seats in these 
elections were in opposition to the Arabist movement. Thus, the argument that these 
elections should not have been viewed by Arabists as an important moment does not hold 
water. In particular, these elections were important for the Arabist movement in Cairo 
due to the fact that they catalyzed both the immigration of politically active Arabists, as 
well as bolstered support for Cairo-based societies throughout Greater Syria. 
The Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo was responsible for the establishment of several 
Arabist societies in Cairo prior to 1912. However, by-and-large these societies were 
limited in scope and fairly limited in their political agendas.
190
 This was largely the result 
of the fact that there was a lack of coordination by Arabists in Cairo with Arabists in 
other parts of the empire, particularly Greater Syria. This changed with the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo’s establishment of the Decentralization Party in 1912. The society 
was founded by “a group of Ottoman gentlemen” led by the Azm brothers191 and would 
emerge as arguably the most important Syrian-led society prior in the pre-World War I 
era.
192
 
The platform of the Decentralization Party was based on the idea that the relative 
diversity of the Ottoman Empire necessitated a decentralized administrative approach.
193
 
In this system the Arabs, as well as other groups throughout the Empire, would have a 
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larger degree of control over their affairs. Despite their desire for increased autonomy the 
Decentralization Party never advocated separation from the Ottoman Empire. The 
society’s charter states that the aim of the society was to work for increased autonomy 
within the existing Ottoman framework.
194
 Regardless of the society’s pro-Ottoman 
platform, the political activeness and influence of the Decentralization Party increasingly 
rendered its members targets of the Young Turk regime.
195
 
An important indicator of the influence of the Decentralization Party was the 
society’s ability to establish branches in major cities across Greater Syria. Between 1912 
and the summer of 1914 the Decentralization Party managed to establish branches in 
Damascus, Beirut, Hama, Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem.
196
 These branches operated under 
the same constitution as the main branch in Cairo and were directly monitored by liaisons 
from Cairo.
197
 Further evidence for viewing these branches as operating under the control 
of the main branch in Cairo can be found through examination of this monitoring system. 
Rafiq Azm was particularly insistent that all branches follow the charter established in 
Cairo and thus all liaisons closely observed the activities of other branches.
198
 If any of 
these branches acted in a manner that deviated from the Cairo branch, they were 
immediately reprimanded.
199
  
The establishment of branches of the Decentralization party throughout Greater 
Syria provides further evidence for how the Parliamentary elections of 1912 enhanced the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo’s ability to transform Cairo into an epicenter of the Arabist 
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movement. The entirety of Decentralization Party branches throughout Greater Syria 
were founded by Syrian elites.
200
 These individuals included: Shafiq al-Mu’ayyad and 
Shukri al-Asali in Damascus, Khalid al-Barazi in Hama, Hafiz al-Said in Jaffa and Said 
al-Husayni in Jerusalem.
201
 One thread of commonality shared by all of these individuals 
is that each one lost their Parliamentary seat in 1912 after being identified by the CUP as 
members of the Arabist opposition.
202
 What can be derived from this is that in the wake 
of the elections Arabists within Greater Syria were willing to accept the leadership of 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. 
The increasing importance of Cairo as a political center of the Arabist movement 
can be seen through analysis of the First Arab Congress of 1913. This congress was 
originally conceived by the al-Fatat society of Paris and thus was held there.
203
 The crux 
of the argument of the Arabist societies present at this conference was that the Young 
Turks failure to recognize Arab claims had created a situation in which the Arab 
provinces were on the verge of chaos and vulnerable to European advances.
204
 Not 
surprisingly given preceding information, the solution proposed by the Arabist delegates 
was increased Decentralization.
205
 In addition, the Arab delegates also proposed Arabic 
as the official language in Arab Vilaytes, new regulations regarding immigration to and 
emigration from Syria and increased Arab representation in the Ottoman Parliament.   
Though the First Arab Congress was conceived by al-Fatat, it was the 
Decentralization Party that served as the political leaders of the conference. Shortly after 
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deciding that the conference was in the interest of the Arabist movement the leadership of 
al-Fatat sent a letter to the leadership of the Decentralization Party in Cairo suggesting 
that the society “take up on itself the presidency of the congress”.206 After some 
discussion Rafiq Azm responded that the Decentralization Society would indeed accept 
the leadership position at the congress.
207
 Azm elected to send Decentralization Party 
member Abdul Hamid al-Zahrawi to the congress to serve as President.
208
 In addition, 
Iskander Ammun would accompany him as the Decentralization Party’s other delegate to 
the congress.
209
 
Although the concessions gained by the Arab delegation at the First Arab 
Congress ultimately proved to very limited, the leadership position of the 
Decentralization Party remains significant in terms of this study.
210
 The fact that al-Fatat 
immediately sought out the Decentralization Party leadership in Cairo to accept the 
Presidency of the congress speaks to the amount of political clout Cairo had within 
Arabist circles by 1913. That this society was founded and comprised completely of 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo suggests that it was this group that 
catalyzed Cairo’s emergence as an important political center of the movement. It was this 
group that was able to successfully capitalize on the 1912 election results to expand 
Cairo’s influence vis-à-vis the Arabist movement. However, in terms of this study it is 
not enough to demonstrate that Cairo emerged as a center of Arabism. For this study to 
achieve its aims it is imperative to analyze Cairo’s development in comparison with that 
of the more well-known Arabist hotbed of Damascus. 
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Analysis Vis-à-Vis Damascus 
Prior to conducting a comparative analysis of Cairo and Damascus as centers of 
the early twentieth-century Arabist movement it is pertinent to note that this section in no 
way seeks to downplay the role of Damascenes in propagating Arabist ideology.  In fact, 
Philip Khoury’s assertion that Damascenes played a disproportionate role in terms of 
“promoting the ideology of Arabism and directing the Arab movement” is supported by 
an analysis that incorporates Cairo as another epicenter of Arabism.
211
 For example, both 
Rafiq and Haqqi Azm, as well as Muhammad al-Din al-Khitab and Muhammad Kurd Ali 
all immigrated to Cairo from Damascus.
212
 The significance of all of these individuals 
has been touched on in this chapter, as well as the preceding.  
Despite the important role of Damascenes within the Arabist movement the years 
in which Arabist societies were rapidly being established (1908-1913) witnessed the 
establishment of very few politically significant societies within Damascus, in contrast to 
Beirut, Istanbul and of course Cairo.
213
 This is largely related to the emigration from 
Damascus generated by the 1912 elections, as well as aforementioned economic, 
occupational and political factors. Thus, while it is certainly appropriate and necessary to 
discuss the importance of Damascenes vis-à-vis the Arabist movement throughout the 
early twentieth century, it is important to consider the fact that many of these individuals 
exerted their influence from centers outside of Damascus. 
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The majority of notable societies established in Damascus during the period of 
1908-1913 were branches of societies founded in other cities.
214
 These branches ranged 
from the Reform Society of Beirut; a society which actively argued for British occupation 
as the answer to Turkification policies, to Al-Ahd; one of the first Arabist societies to 
actively argue for Arab independence, to the Decentralization Party.
215
 In terms of 
comparison with Cairo, this lack of Damascus-based societies presents a stark contrast. 
Not only was the aforementioned Decentralization Party established, but other societies 
that had significant influence, such as The Arab Revolutionary society; a society which 
argued for actively combating the Turks to achieve Decentralization, were also 
established in Cairo during this period.
216
 In addition, branches of both of these societies 
would be established in Damascus thus putting the Damascus societies directly under the 
umbrella of the Syrian Arabists in Cairo.
217
 
The important role played by the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo at the First Arab 
Congress in Paris has already been discussed at length. The fact that it was the 
Decentralization Party that ultimately assumed leadership over the congress speaks to the 
central place of the Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo.
218
 What is 
interesting here is that, in contrast to Cairo Arabists residing in Damascus seem to have 
had little involvement with the organizational aspect of the congress. This is evidenced 
by the fact that among the delegates that attended the congress not one was a 
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representative of a Damascus-based society.
219
 Though there were many Damascenes 
there, all of them were operating within societies based out of alternative centers. 
In addition to sending very few delegates to the Paris Congress, Damascus served 
as one of the most vocals centers of opposition to the conference. These objectors were 
by-and-large individuals who worked closely with the CUP and as such managed to 
maintain positions within the bureaucracy pot-1912.
220
 As has been mentioned, the 
individuals who managed to hold power in Damascus post-1912 did not have strong 
Arabist leanings. For example, the fact that it was Abd al-Rahman al Yusuf, one of the 
three individuals who retained his parliamentary seat in 1912, who organized the 
conference against the Paris Congress, demonstrates that pro-CUP notables were a 
significant part of this objection.
221
 What can be derived here is that in contrast to Cairo 
which was a strong center of Arabist leadership, Damascus was by 1913 an area where 
the CUP was capable of exploiting the lack of Arabist presence for its own means.
222
 As 
such, by this time it became fair to say that Cairo not only competed with Damascus for 
political significance, but in some ways had usurped Damascus as the dominant political 
center of the movement. 
Another area in which Cairo was competitive with Damascus in terms of political 
significance is the production of publications. Several of these publications, mostly 
taking the form of newspapers and periodicals, regularly contained the writings of 
prominent members of the Arabist movement.
223
 These writings produced by individuals 
                                               
219 Tauber, 185-186. 
220 Tauber, 184. 
221 Khalidi, 59. 
222 Tauber, 184. 
223 The statistics regarding the publications of the Syrians in Egypt can be found on pages 5 and 6 of the 
introduction. 
 58 
such as Kawakabi, Rida, Rafiq Azm, Haqqi Azm, Muhammad Kurd Ali and Naguib 
Azoury discussed different conceptions of how the Arabs could regain their former 
glory.
224
 Furthermore, post-1908 these writings began to increasingly question, and in 
many cases outright criticize the policies of the CUP. As a result of the increasingly strict 
press regulations imposed by the Young Turk government, Arabists in Damascus had a 
far more difficult time producing this sort of literature literature. 
 Al-Manar published by Rashid Rida between 1898 and 1935 serves as a prime 
example of an influential publication produced by Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo.
225
 During the years of its publication Al-Manar was responsible 
for the publication of over thirty-thousand pages of literature.
226
 Although this 
publication was not presented as an Arabist periodical, there is an obvious emphasis on 
Arabist ideology that can be seen in numerous volumes.
227
 Evidence for this can be found 
through the examination of the individuals who regularly published in Al-Manar. All of 
the individuals in the preceding paragraph aside from Naguib Azoury published in al-
Manar. In the case of Rafiq Azm, he published his work in the periodical on a regular 
basis.
228
 Thus, Al-Manar served as a forum for the dissemination of Arabist ideology that 
had no legitimate equivalent in Damascus. 
Although it did not have a significant impact on the Greater Syrian populous, the 
fact that this Cairo-based publication was so widely circulated in greater Syrian political 
circles is relevant in terms of evaluating Cairo’s political importance vis-à-vis Damascus. 
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As has been established in the introduction the discussion of the Arabist movement 
during this period should be situated within the framework of intellectual movements. In 
other words, those propagating Arabist ideology during this period were not entirely 
effective in terms of gaining support among the lower classes.
229
 Evidence of this can be 
found in Mark Sykes presentation on the Arabist movement in which he states that the 
movement is an elite movement that has not reached the populous.
230
 Thus, comparative 
arguments regarding significance and influence of an Arabist group or a publication must 
be conducted via examination of elite, political circles. 
As the preceding paragraph has stated, Al-Manar had little influence on the 
ideological orientations of the Greater Syrian masses.
231
 This was related to the 
periodical’s elitist view of Arabism, as well as a lack of literacy among the Greater 
Syrian populous.
232
 However, within circles of Arabist political elites, Al-Manar was 
frequently read and well respected.
233
 In Damascus in particular Al-Manar was common 
reading within intellectual circles.
234
 Thus, within the context of Arabism as an 
intellectual movement al-Manar should certainly be viewed as an influential publication. 
 At the onset of the World War I Cairo was on many levels a more significant 
political center for the Arabist movement than the more frequently analyzed Arabist 
center of Damascus. The fact that Syrian Arabists in Cairo were more active in terms of 
forming societies, pushing for Arab autonomy and publishing indicates that Cairo be 
considered at the very least comparable with Damascus in terms of political importance. 
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Placed in the broader context of understanding the Arabist movement in the early 
twentieth century, the above analysis of Cairo suggests that the tendency to focus so 
heavily on Damascus has blurred the picture in terms of the size and scope of the Arabist 
movement during this period. 
 
The Utility of Examining Alternative Centers 
 What the case study of Cairo demonstrates is that even though the Syrians are 
often described as the intellectual backbone of the movement, this does not imply that 
scholars can expect to understand the size and scope of the movement through the 
exclusive analysis of one or two centers within Greater Syria.
235
 Evidence of this can be 
seen in the fact that if a scholar were to overlook Cairo as an important Arabist center 
their analysis of the movement would be incomplete.
236
 Thus, the political significance of 
the Syrian-led Cairene Arabist societies necessitates a reassessment of scholarship that 
discusses the movement without sufficiently study centers outside of Damascus. 
 The disproportionate amount of Arabists located outside of Damascus can be seen 
in the chart provided by C. Ernest Dawn in From Ottomanism to Arabism. While it is true 
that the vast majority of the Arabists listed by Dawn were Damascenes, the majority of 
these individuals were by the onset of World War I either operating out of other centers 
or members of societies whose main branch was located outside of Damascus.
237
 As the 
above study has demonstrated, several of the individuals listed were affiliated with the 
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Cairo-based Decentralization Society.
238
 Therefore, failure to properly analyze alternative 
centers necessarily means that the activities of a significant number of Syrian Arabists 
will not be adequately understood.  
 The above analysis of Cairo as a leading political center of the Arabist movement 
has significant implications in terms of drawing conclusions regarding the size and scope 
of the early twentieth century Arabist movement. Going back to Khaidi’s assertion 
necessity of examining Arabist centers outside of Damascus, this case study illustrates 
clearly that other centers were comparable to Damascus in terms of size and political 
influence.
239
 Though this study only provides analysis of one important alternative center 
it is useful in that the analysis provides evidence to support the conclusion that in order to 
fully comprehend the early twentieth century Arabist movement it is imperative to 
analyze multiple centers.
240
 
 
Conclusion 
 During the period of 1908-1914 the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo catalyzed 
Cairo’s development into an epicenter of the Arabist movement that eventually usurped 
Damascus in terms of political significance. The most formative years in terms of this 
development were 1912-1914. It was during this period that the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo managed to established societies that would play a significant role in shaping the 
Arabist political agenda.    
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 The Arabist societies formed by the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during this 
period were arguably among the most politically important Arabist societies in the pre-
World War I era. The example of the Decentralization Party that is used throughout this 
study is a prime example of this. Analysis of this society demonstrates that Arabists and 
other viewed this society as politically important. The fact that this society was selected 
to preside over the First Arab Congress is a testament to this fact.  
 In addition to the activities of the societies, publications produced by the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo contributed to Cairo’s development into a politically significant 
Arabist center. Although al-Manar, as well as other publications produced by these 
groups did little to influence the populous, this publication in particular was read and 
respect by Arabist political figures throughout Greater Syria. This taken in conjunction 
with the activities of the Cairo-based societies, allow Cairo to compare very favorably 
with Damascus in terms of political significance.  
 The development of Cairo into a political center of the Arabist movement 
provides support for Khalidi’s assertion regarding the utility of analyzing alternative 
centers of Arabism. Through increased analysis of the size and scope of the Arabist 
movement in areas such as Cairo one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
the broader movement during this period.
241
 More support for the importance of Cairo 
vis-à-vis the broader Arabist movement, as well as implications of analyzing alternative 
centers will be provided in the next chapter. 
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Introduction 
The following chapter examines the activities and contributions of Arabists within 
the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during the era of World War I (1914-1918). 
Furthermore, this chapter will analyze the impact of the war on the ideological 
orientations of these Arabists. Though several historians of the period acknowledge a 
connection between the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo and the Revolt in the Desert
242
, 
elaboration on the significance of this connection, as well as the relationship of this group 
to the broader war effort is lacking. Likewise, despite a great deal of literature regarding 
the impact of the war on the broader Syrian Arabist movement
243
 a specific analysis of its 
impact on Syrian Arabists in Cairo is noticeably absent. 
In the period leading up to World War I Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo were among the first to be approached by the British regarding the possibility of 
Arabist cooperation against the Turks.
244
 The majority of the individuals contacted were 
members of the Decentralization Party discussed at length in chapters two and three.
245
 
Despite the fact that very few members of this group were involved in the military aspect 
of the Arab Revolt
246
, this chapter argues that the Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo contributed significantly to the revolt, and broader allied World War I effort via 
diplomacy, negotiations and production of literature. Furthermore, this chapter will argue 
that dissatisfaction with British actions in the last years of the war, as well as the actions 
of Sherif Hussein catalyzed significant ideological shifts within the Syrian intelligentsia 
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in Cairo in terms of their attitudes toward aiding the British, as well as adherence to 
Arabist ideology. 
 The aims of the following chapter are three-fold. First, this chapter intends to 
provide support for Philip Khoury’s assertion that it was the Syrian Arabists in Cairo that 
gave the Arab Revolt “Arab nationalist ideological content”.247 Implicit is this aim is the 
idea that this chapter will challenge the notion that contributions of Syrian Arabists to the 
revolt in the desert was relatively insignificant.
248
 Secondly, this chapter aims to examine 
the war time contributions of Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo that related 
directly to stimulating and carrying out the Arab revolt, as well as their broader 
contributions to the allied war effort. This will be demonstrated through the analysis of 
the activities of this group in the last years of the war. Thirdly, this chapter aims to 
illuminate the precise developments during this period that catalyzed shifts within the 
movement in question.  
 The following chapter will address four specific questions: How did the British 
perceive the Syrian Arabists in Cairo? How did Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo perceive the British? What role do the Arabists with the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo play in the Arab Revolt/broader war effort? What ideological shifts occur within 
this group during the war years and why? In terms of structure, this chapter will be 
organized into five sections. The first section will examine the existing literature 
pertaining to this subject. The second section will analyze how British officials perceived 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. The third section will discuss how 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo perceived the British. The fourth section 
                                               
247 Khoury, 77. 
248 This will be discussed in the forthcoming section regarding historiography. 
 66 
will explore how Arabists within this community impacted the Arab Revolt/broader war 
effort. Lastly, the fifth section will look at how World War I impacted the ideological 
orientations of Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. 
 
Historiography 
 Within scholarship regarding Arabism during the war years a debate has emerged 
regarding the degree to which the Syrian Arabist movement actually affected the Arab 
Revolt. The origins of this debate go back to Antonius’s The Arab Awakening (1938). In 
this work Antonius argues that the Damascus Protocol composed by the Syrian Arabist 
leaders was the document allowed the Arab Revolt led to take place.
249
 In essence, 
Antonius uses this logic to argue for the Arab Revolt as the culmination of a Syrian-led 
Arab independence movement that began in the late nineteenth century.
250
 
 In the 1950’s some revisionist scholars suggested that the Syrian Arabists lack of 
military involvement, combined with Sherif Hussein’s lack of interest in Arabist ideology 
necessitated that the Arab Revolt not be viewed as possessing Arabist ideological 
content.
251
 According to this view, the Syrian Arabist movement “was an independent 
force that was of minor significance to the origin of the Arab Revolt.”252 In this view the 
fact that Sherif Hussein was driven by his own ambitions to obtain power, as opposed to 
ambitions to create an independent Arab state indicate that the Revolt was not initiated 
under the banner of Arabism.
253
 Problematic here is the fact that this view tends to 
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downplay the role of Syrian Arabists, particularly those in Cairo, in the initial phases of 
organizing the Arab Revolt.  
 Like the revisionists of the 1950’s, scholar Philip Khoury acknowledges the self-
serving ambitions of Sherif Hussein.
254
 However, as has been stated in the introduction 
Khoury’s work is not as quick to dismiss the significance of the Syrian Arabists in laying 
the groundwork for the revolt.
255
 Though he does argue that Syrian Arabists in Cairo did 
not contribute significantly to the military aspect of the revolt, he points out that their 
negotiations with the British in the years leading up to the Revolt secured the necessary 
support for Sherif Hussein from Arab notables in various areas of the Ottoman Empire.
256
 
It is this paradigm that this chapter will seek to expand upon via the analysis of the 
activities of Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. 
 In terms of the impact of the war years on the Syrian Arabist movement, there is 
little argument among scholars that these four years significantly altered the movement. 
There are however differing views on the nature of this impact. According to revisionist 
historians such as Dawn and Zeine N. Zeine, the war years served to solidify Arabism as 
the primary national allegiance of the Syrians.
257
 Specifically, these scholars argue that 
the events of World War I led Syrians previously not involved in the Arabist movement 
to join their brethren in forming a solitary program of Arab unity that could combat 
foreign interference.
258
 
 The flaws within the aforementioned paradigm are highlighted in James Gelvin’s 
Divided Loyalties (1998). In this work Gelvin points out that, although the war years did 
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have an impact on nationalism among the Syrians, it did not solidify Arabism as the 
dominant ideology.
259
 According to Gelvin, the uprisings against Fysal’s Arab 
government are testament to the heterogeneous nature of nationalism among the Syrian in 
the post-war years.
260
 This chapter will use the ideological changes that occurred among 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo during the war years to expand upon this 
analysis.  
 
British Attitudes Toward the Syrian Intelligentsia in Cairo 
 At the dawn of World War I the Arabist movement was “Syrian-inspired and 
dominated”.261 British diplomatic correspondences from the war years suggest that the 
British government was acutely aware of this dynamic. Evidence of this can be found in 
Lieutenant Mark Sykes’s assertion that the Syrians acted as the “driving power behind 
the Arab Nationalist movement” in the early years of the twentieth century.262 
Furthermore, in his 1914 memo to London British diplomat Mr. Fitzmaurice described 
the Syrians as the Arabs most likely to be receptive to taking up arms against the Young 
Turks.
263
   
 The significance of the Syrians in relation to British interests was part and parcel 
of the fact that the British saw supporting the Arabist movement as “their principle 
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weapon against the Turks” throughout World War I.264 In the view of Sir Mallet, a British 
diplomat stationed in Cairo, the British could deal the Turks a crushing blow by 
“promoting Arab movements in any and all parts of the region”.265 Mr. Fitzmaurice 
echoed these sentiments when discussing the potential embarrassment that a revitalized 
Arabist movement supported by the British would cause the Young Turks.
266
 Thus, as of 
1914 the British strategy for countering Turkish entrance into World War I relied heavily 
on their ability to garner the support of the Arabist movement.  
 Given the leading role of the Syrians in the Arabist movement at the onset of 
World War I, it is hardly surprising that the British reached out to several leaders of the 
movement to gauge the feelings toward joining the allies. Mark Sykes went so far as to 
assert that the success of any potential Arab revolt centered on British ability to influence 
the Syrian intellectuals.
267
  As a result of the parliamentary elections of 1912 in which 
only three out of the hitherto twenty-one Syrian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament were 
re-elected in 1912, an increasing number of politically active Arabists emigrated from 
Damascus to Cairo. This wave of emigration, combined with earlier waves related to 
Hamidian and Young Turk oppression resulted in Damascus losing a great deal of its 
political hegemony over the Arabist movement by the start of World War I.
268
 Thus, 
although Damascus served as the location for some of the most important meetings 
between the British and Arab leaders, it was members of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
that were among the first contacted by the British in the lead up to the war.
269
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 While British sources mention by name several members of the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo as having contact with the British
270
, it is British attitudes toward 
Al Azhar Sheik and publisher Rashid Rida, Decentralization Party President Rafiq Azm 
and his cousin Haqqi Azm that best illustrate the perceived importance of the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo. In a letter composed in 1915 by British Foreigner Officer Sir 
Ronald Storrs the Azm cousins are described as individuals the British could count on for 
information regarding the mood of the Arabist movement.
271
 In fact, both Rafiq and 
Haqqi Azm had established an amiable relationship with the British well before the Arab 
revolt.
272
 Due to their comparative lack of Islamic fervor, in view of the British the Rafiq 
and Haqqi Azm were not fanatical revolutionaries, but reasonable men open to the idea of 
cooperating with foreign powers to achieve their aims.
273
 
 In contrast to British perceptions of Rafiq and Haqqi Azm, the British saw Rashid 
Rida as important, but potentially problematic. Although Rida initially aided the British 
in the early years of the war
274
, some in the British ranks perceived him as “a Pan-Arabist 
chauvinist agitator” whose writings and speeches contained overtones of religious 
fanaticism.
275
 Despite this, the British understood Rida’s importance. In the same report 
that describes him as a “Pan-Arabist chauvinist” a later sentence acknowledges that his 
influence extends from Cairo to India.
276
 Sir Ronald Storrs echoes these sentiments in a 
letter to Iraqi Arabist leader Abd-al Azzi al Masri in which he describes Rida as an 
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influential individual that would be a powerful ally.
277
 Thus, regardless of his personal 
beliefs, the British saw Rida as an individual who could help them garner Muslim and 
Syrian support for Sherif Hussein, and the Arab Revolt. 
 
Syrian Intelligentsia Perceptions of the British 
 As World War I approached Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
began to consider cooperation with foreign powers. During this period the Syrian 
community in Egypt was as a rule strongly anti-French.
278
 In the words of Rafiq Azm, 
“The Syrians are primarily attached to the Ottoman Empire therefore France has nothing 
to look for in Syria”.279 In light of the fact that Young Turks sided with the entante 
powers, it would have been somewhat counterproductive from the Arabists to do the 
same.
280
 Thus, the option left for many Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
was to consider the overtures of the British. 
 As of 1914 the idea of corroborating with the British was not uncommon among 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. Rationale for this can be seen in Arabist 
political activist Naguib Azuri’s assertion that “Britain has no ambition to occupy 
Syria”.281 Furthermore, many members of this community viewed their lives under 
British rule as much more comfortable and tolerant than the lives of Syrians residing in 
areas directly controlled by the CUP.
282
 As such, certain members of this community 
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took it upon themselves to write letters persuading Syrians in other parts of the Empire 
(particularly Damascus) to support collaboration with the British against the CUP.
283
 
 In run up to the Arab Revolt a movement emerged among Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to annex Syria to Egypt so it could be under British 
control.
284
 This concept was introduced by a small group of intellectuals that included 
noted journalist Muhammad Kurd Ali and his brother, Ahmed.
285
 Upon hearing this plan 
several Syrian émigrés in Cairo
286
 contacted British Counsel-General in Egypt, Lord 
Kitchener to set up a meeting to figure out how to make this plan a reality.
287
  
 It should be noted that, while the above information does indicate a strong level of 
support for cooperation with the British among Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo, this support was by no means unanimous. Among the most fervent objectors was 
Rashid Rida’s protégée, Shakib Arslan. Arslan was a young Syrian who had emigrated 
from Syria to Cairo to study under Rida. Arslan, like other Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo, believed in the establishment of an independent Arab state.
288
 He 
disagreed however that collaborating with the British was the best way to achieve 
independence.  
Arslan and Rida quarreled vehemently over the decision to collaborate with the 
British.
289
 Though Arslan was opposed to the policies of the Young Turks
290
, it was his 
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view that the Ottoman Empire represented a lesser evil than that of the European 
powers.
291
 Despite these objections, Arslan did not yield a great deal of influence at this 
point in his life.
292
 He was still very much Rida’s apprentice and had nowhere near the 
power of Rida, the Azm’s or Muhammad Kurd Ali. Thus, it was not until the later years 
of the war that Arslan’s objections gained more widespread support within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo.
293
 
At the onset of World War I both the British and Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo saw a wartime alliance as a real possibility. Indeed, the British and 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo would engage in significant interactions 
throughout the war years. However, the complex and shifting nature of this relationship 
renders the actual contributions of Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo 
worthy of examination. 
 
Contributions to the War Effort 
The initial involvement of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo vis-à-vis World War I 
was in the arena of diplomacy. In early 1914 the British approached the Decentralization 
Society regarding the possibility of sending representatives to various Arab leaders 
inquiring about their attitudes toward a British-sponsored movement against the Turks.
294
 
In response, the Decentralization Society, arguably the most important Syrian-led society 
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prior in the pre-World War I era,
295
 sent Muhammad al-Din al-Kitab and Shaikh 
Muhammad al-Qaqili to areas across Greater Syria, Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf and 
the Hejaz to get a feel for how the potential revolt would be perceived.
296
 In addition, 
Haqqi Azm himself traveled to Syria on behalf to the British to gather information 
regarding the attitudes and readiness of the Syrian military.
297
  
Though a member of the Decentralization Society, the British opted to make use 
of Rashid Rida’s influence in a slightly different fashion. Rida was approached by the 
British in hopes that he could use his position as Imam at Al-Azhar to persuade the more 
religious elements in the Arab world to support a British-sponsored revolt.
298
 
Specifically, Rida was asked by the British to send emissaries to Ibn Saud and Imam 
Yihya.
299
 This collaboration, as well as that of other Decentralization Society members 
was not taken lightly by the CUP. In 1915 the aforementioned emissaries, as well as 
those accused of dispensing them were sentenced to death.
300
  
 In addition to their assistance in negotiations abroad, Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo also assisted the British with matters regarding the Arabist 
movement in Cairo. This was particularly true of Rafiq and Haqqi Azm. An example of 
this can be seen in 1915 when Habib Lutfallah and Muktahr el-Solh arrived in Cairo.
301
 
These two individuals were Syrian émigrés and former CUP partisans who now claimed 
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they wanted to help the British in their efforts to organize an Arab Revolt.
302
 In an effort 
to get a sense for the sincerity of Lutfallah and el-Solh, the British enlisted the services of 
Rafiq and Haqqi Azm.
303
 The request from the British was that the Azm’s meet with 
Luftallah and el-Solh and report their impressions to the British.
304
 The rationale for 
selecting the Azm’s was that they were deeply involved in the Arabists movement and 
had intimate knowledge of its dynamics.
305
 
 Another example of Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo aiding 
negotiations can be seen through analysis of interactions with Sherif Hussein’s second 
son, Amir Abdullah. Throughout much of the lead up to WWI Amir Abdullah was 
negotiating with the British and Arabists in Cairo. During one of his trips through Cairo 
in 1914 he met with Rashid Rida. During this meeting Rida made Abdullah an honorary 
member of the Society of the Arab Association.
306
 In addition, Rida advocated that 
Abdullah ask his father to consider the British-approved pact for unity among the rulers 
of the Arabian Peninsula.
307
  
 By mid-1915 Ottoman civil and military head in Syria, Djemal Pasha had grown 
increasingly suspicious of the activities of the Syrian Arabists. After being defeated in 
Egypt in 1914 Djemal Pasha began a campaign to “stamp out all non-Turkish currents in 
the State, especially Arab and Armenian nationalism.”308 This program made it virtually 
impossible for Arabists within Syrian to produce anti-CUP/pro-British propaganda 
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without substantial risk. Thus, any propaganda supporting an Arab independence effort 
would likely have been produced outside of Greater Syria.      
The relatively free press in Egypt allowed Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo to produce pro-British/anti-Young Turk propaganda that Arabists in other parts 
of the empire would have been incapable of circulating. The 1913 “Proclamation to the 
Arabs, Sons of Qahtan” is an example of a piece of anti-Turkish propaganda that was 
viewed by the British as promoting their agenda.
309
 Though the letter is not blatantly pro-
British, the facts that it advocates the Arabs “draw their swords against his oppressors 
and destroyers (the Turks)”310 to achieve their complete independence311 was seen by the 
British as favorable to their cause. In addition, one of the writers of the document, Haqqi 
Azm
312
 was already working with British officials. Thus, although the document did not 
directly suggest that the Arabs align with the British, the fact that this widely circulated 
document
313
 called on the Arabs to rise up against the Young Turks was taken by British 
officials as a positive sign. 
 A more explicitly pro-British piece of propaganda produced by Syrian Arabists in 
Cairo was produced by Habib Luftallah and Muktahr El-Solh shortly after the hangings 
of ten Syrian notables suspected of treason.
 314
 This document, which Rafiq and Haqqi 
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Azm helped to circulate throughout Syria
315
, contained a total of eighty-four instructions 
for the Arab people to follow.
316
 The first of the eight-four points contained in this note 
was that the Arabs were to “help the British government by all means in (their) power to 
get rid of the Turks and the Germans.”317 The letter goes on in point nine to state that the 
Arabs should “approach the British government with a view to their supplying our secret 
and other societies with arms and money until such time as we are able to shake of the 
yoke and organize ourselves”.318 Thus, this document can be viewed as a clear example 
of pro-British literature being produced and distributed by Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo. 
 In addition to producing pro-British and anti-CUP literature, as the revolt began in 
1916 Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo also began producing material 
advocating support for the Sherif of Mecca. The Sherif’s record of corroborating with the 
Ottoman government and striving for his own self-aggrandizement left some in the Arab 
world to question his position as leader of the revolt.
319
  Conscious of this situation, 
Rashid Rida composed a piece in Al-Manar describing the Sherif’s past.320 In this piece 
Rida explains that in the past the Sherif had been deceived by the CUP and thought he 
was doing the right thing by showing loyalty toward the State.
321
 Rida concluded, 
however that at the present time the Sherif was aware of his past errors and was no longer 
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under the influence of the CUP.
322
 As a result of this, Rida suggest that Arabs should be 
supportive of the Sherif, as well as the nascent Arab Revolt.
323
 
As the war progressed certain elements within the British ranks sought to expand 
the role of the Cairene Arabist societies within the Syrian intelligentsia beyond gathering 
information and disseminating literature. By early 1917 elements within the British 
Foreign service began to question the organization of the forces in the Hejaz led by the 
Sherif and his sons.
324
 To counter this lack of organization, British Colonial 
Administrator Sir Ronald Wingate proposed assembling an Arab Legion comprised of 
“prisoners of war and the Syrians in Egypt”325 It was these elements that Wingate felt 
would best promote Arab and Syrian unity.
326
 Since by this time Arab (particularly 
Syrian) support for the Sherif was beginning to wane
327, it was Wingate’s hope that 
assembling a legion from the areas where Arab nationalism was strongest would allow 
this unit to symbolize the movement.
328
 Although Wingate’s vision never materialized in 
a significant way, the idea that the Syrians in Egypt represented a community where 
Arabist sentiments and organization were comparatively strong supports the preceding 
information regarding the importance of the Syrian Arabists in Cairo in the early stages 
of the war. 
As World War I drew to a close the British remained in close contact with 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. By March 1918 Syrian Arabist opinion 
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both within Greater Syria as well as Egypt was “hardening against Zionism”.329 In the 
wake of the Balfour Declaration this increasing anti-Zionist fervor led many in the Arab 
world to simultaneously question the intentions of the British vis-à-vis the Arabs after the 
war. In an effort to reconcile this issue the British supported the effort of the Syrian in 
Cairo to send a delegation to Palestine to help resolve the tensions between the Arabs and 
the Zionists.
330
 This delegation had five representatives; among them were Rafiq Azm 
and Muhktar El-Solh.
331
 In a testament to the diplomatic sway held by this group, British 
General Clayton describes the delegation’s visit as having had “a tranquilizing effect on 
the (Arab) population (of Palestine), Christian and Muslim alike”.332 
On May 7, 1918 seven representatives of the Syrian Unity Party composed a 
memorandum to the British government inquiring about its intentions to honor its pre-
revolt agreements with the Arabs.
333
 In this document these seven individuals, among 
them Rashid Rida
334
, Rafiq Azm and Muktahr El-Solh
335
, claimed to be the foundation 
and intellectual ideologues of the Hussein-led Arab revolt.
336
 In addition, this 
memorandum requested that the British government confirm their intentions to respect 
Arab and Syrian autonomy.
337
 This document was not taken lightly by the British Foreign 
Office. 
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In response to the memorandum from the Seven Syrians, the Arab Bureau in 
Cairo four point memorandum known as “The Declaration to Seven Syrians”.338 In this 
document, the British Foreign office assured the seven Syrians that they viewed their 
memorandum as a document of high value
339
 and attempted to reassure them that the 
British government would support autonomous Arab rule.
340
 What is significant here is 
that this document suggests that the British continued to view the Syrian Arabist in Cairo 
as significant to the Arab movement/war effort through the end of World War I. 
 Although Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo were active throughout 
the war years, the attitudes of this group did not remain stagnant. Beginning around 1917 
Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo began to reconsider their support for the 
Arab Revolt.
341
 The result of this dissatisfaction was the emergence of ideologies and 
societies that would impact nationalism is Syria in the post-war era. 
 
Ideological Shifts 
 By 1917 Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo who had initially 
supported the British and the Sherif began to question their decision. In terms of the 
British, the reasons for waning support have been touched on in the previous section. The 
combination of their support for Zionism, as well as increasing suspicion of agreements 
being broken led individuals such as Rashid Rida to go from supporting the British to 
actively working to combat their interests in the region.
342
 In addition, the Syrian Unity 
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Party, a society in which several Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo were 
members
343
 sought to abandon British patronage and actively began seeking the support 
of the United States.
344
   
 In addition to dwindling support for the British, the latter years of the war bore 
witness to a decrease in support for Sherif Hussein within the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo. Even individuals who had supported the Sherif in the early years of the war began 
to view him as a self-interested British puppet by the end of World War I.
345
 These 
perceptions led Rashid Rida to go so far as to describe the Sherif and his sons as “the 
worst disaster that has befallen Islam in this age”.346 Rida was far from the only 
individual to lose faith in the revolt. According to Amin Said, many of the Syrians in 
Cairo who had long worked for the Arab cause had, by 1918 gradually disassociated 
themselves from Sherif Hussein.
347
 The reasons for this according to Said were the 
Sherif’s inflexible nature, as well as his failure to heed the advice of Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo.
348
 
 In addition to the Sherif’s stubborn disposition, his personal ambitions to achieve 
Arab Unity through his own Kingship also did not sit well with Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo.
349
 From the outset of the War many Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo had expressed desires for Syria to function as an 
autonomous state.
350
 Although these individuals advocated strong connections with the 
Sherif and other Arab leaders, they did not want to be directly under their rule. This 
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stance directly conflicted with the notion held by the Sherif and his sons that it was 
essential to incorporate Syrian into the Arab kingdom that they would rule over.
351
 
Abdullah went so far as to state that “if Syria were to not be in the new Arab kingdom, 
the revolt would have been in vein”.352 
 The diminishing confidence in the Sherif led some Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo to move away from Arabist ideology. Several of these individuals 
began to view Arab identity as secondary to Syrian identity.
353
 An external manifestation 
of this ideological shift can be seen in the establishment of the Syrian Unity Party.
354
 This 
group was established in Cairo in 1918 and contained several individuals who had 
previously been involved in the Arabist movement.
355
 Among these individuals were; 
Rafiq Azm, Iskandar Ammun, Rashid Rida, Abdel Rahman Shabender and Muhktar El-
Solh.
356
 
 The constitution of the Syrian Unity Party differed from constitutions of earlier 
societies established by the same individuals. In previous years, these individuals had set 
forth constitutions containing fairly strong Arabist overtones.
357
 The primary points of the 
constitutions of the Syrian Unity Party were as follows:  
There should be an undivided Syria bounded by the Taurus mountains, the Arabian 
desert, the Sinai desert and the Mediterranean, That’s (Syria’s) independence should be 
declared at the Paris Peace conference, That politically it should be a federation of states 
with a central democratic government, That religion should be entirely independent of the 
government, That Arabic should be the country’s one official language.358 
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Aside from the last point, the entirety of the constitution was focused on the ambitions of 
Syria, not the broader Arab movement.  
 The constitution of the Syrian Unity Party provides support for the assertion that 
the war years brought about an ideological shift among hitherto Arabist Syrians. 
Specifically, the ideological orientation of the Syrian Unity Party demonstrates that the 
events during World War I caused Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to 
rethink their relationship with Sherif Hussein, and the broader Arab movement. This case 
study should be viewed as evidence that nationalism among the Syrians in the post-war 
period was more complex than simply supporting the Arab movement. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the years leading up to World War I British officials and Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia perceived one another as being able to aid their causes. It was these 
perceptions that led the two entities to cooperate in the early stages of the war. 
Throughout the war Arabists within the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo aided the Allies’ 
war effort largely through diplomacy, negotiations and propaganda. Though attempts by 
the British to garner a stronger military contribution from Arabists within the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo ultimately failed, the fact that British officials perceived this group 
as significant through the end of the war indicates that their contributions to World War I 
cannot be underestimated. 
 While a significant portion of the war-time contributions of Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo was directly related to stimulating the Arab Revolt (i.e. 
negations with Arab leaders and some pro-Sherif literature) their contributions extended 
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beyond this theater. Evidence of this can be seen in the negotiations between individuals 
within this community and Zionist leaders toward the end of the war, as well as the 
memorandum of the Seven Syrians that was issued independent of the knowledge of the 
Sherif and his sons. Thus, to completely grasp the contributions of Arabists within the 
Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to the war effort, it is essential to look beyond developments 
in Arabia. 
 The combination of broken agreements by the British and dissatisfaction with the 
organization, self-centeredness and stubbornness of the Sherif led important individuals 
with in the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo to reconsider their relationship with the Arabist 
movement. Though many of the individuals had fought for Arab autonomy for decades, 
the new direction of the movement led many to view Syrianism as a viable alternative. 
The founding of the Syrian Unity Party is a telling example of this. Thus, the year of 
1914-1918 brought about a significant shift in the identity within the Syrian intelligentsia 
in Cairo. The Arabists dimension which had for over a decade been so strong within this 
community began to diminish and in its place emerged Syrian nationalist sentiments that 
would greatly impact post-war efforts to establish a Fysal-led Arab government in 
Syria.
359
 
  
  
                                               
359 For an in-depth analysis of this see Gelvin’s Divided Loyalties. 
 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 86 
  Throughout the period of 1900-1918 Cairo emerged as an Arabist center extreme 
political importance. This development was largely the result of the activities of one 
particular group, the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. As more and more politically active 
Arabists immigrated from Greater Syria to Cairo there was a noticeable shift in Cairo’s 
significance vis-à-vis the broader Arabist movement. 
Despite the fact that the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo catalyzed Cairo’s 
development into a political epicenter of the Arabist movement, a homogenous 
ideological conception of Arabism never emerged within this group. Throughout the 
period examined Arabist leaders within this group differed in their conceptions of what 
Arabism meant. Furthermore, these ideological rifts were not confined to simply 
Christian Arabists vs. Muslim Arabists. These conflicts can be seen through analysis of 
the internal dynamics of these groups. 
 Increased cooperation between ideological divergent Arabists within this group 
was largely catalyzed by the perceptions of increased Ottoman tyranny and 
incompetence. This can be seen during both the Hamidian and Young Turk periods. 
During both of these eras numerous Arabists societies emerged that contained members 
of very different ideological backgrounds. As opposed to C. Ernest Dawn’s suggestion 
that the increased cooperation seen these societies is related to the ideological 
convergence of Christian and Muslim Arabists, the sources employed in this study 
suggest that this cooperation was more likely the result of a sense among Arabists that 
they were facing a broader threat. Specifically, these Arabists found common ground in 
the form of opposition to Ottoman policies. Thus, the increased cooperation throughout 
this period should be seen less as the result of the development of a homogenous version 
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of Arabism than the result of Arabists with differing ideological orientations finding 
common political interests.  
 The increased cooperation facilitated by Hamidian/Young Turk policies, 
combined with an influx of politically active Syrian Arabists post-1912 set the stage for 
Cairo’s development into a political epicenter of the Arabist movement. Though the years 
of 1900-1911 (particularly the years between 1908 and 1911) bore witness to the 
establishment of several important Arabist societies by the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo, 
it was in 1912 that one can observe Cairo’s emergence as a leading Arabist political 
center. It was during the years of 1912-1914 that Cairene Arabists societies founded by 
Syrian Arabists were more politically influential than those operating in Damascus.  
 Evidence for the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo catalyzing Cairo’s development as 
a political epicenter can be seen in various areas. The fact that it was Syrian Arabists that 
founded the most politically influential societies, including the Decentralization Society, 
speaks to their importance. Furthermore, the fact that Arabist publications produced in 
Cairo by the Syrian intelligentsia were larger in number and readership than those 
originating in Damascus is evidence of Cairo’s significance. These factors that point to 
Cairo replacing Damascus as the dominant political center of the Arabist movement were 
further highlighted with the onset of World War I. 
  As it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was going to enter World War I on 
the German side the allies, particularly the British, began to focus on mobilizing the 
Arabist movement. In the minds of British officials the best way to go about this was by 
first winning over the movements intellectual leaders, the Syrians. It was the Syrian 
Arabists in Cairo that were among the first to be contacted by the British during this 
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period. By and large, these Arabists were affiliated with the Decentralization Society and 
actively aided the ally’s efforts to combat the CUP in via the Arab Revolt, as well as 
other efforts. The fact that the British were so willing to solicit cooperation from Syrian 
Arabists in Cairo at the onset of the war, as well as continue to work with these 
individuals through 1918 speaks to the fact that Cairo was perceived as an important 
political and intercultural epicenter of the movement through the end of the First World 
War. 
 The years of World War I precipitated a shift in the ideological orientations of 
several Arabist leaders within the Syrian Intelligentsia in Cairo. The combination of 
broken British promises and the stubbornness of Sherif Hussein led to and increasing 
espousal of Syrianist ideology among these individuals. Thus, as opposed to solidifying 
Arabism as a universal excepted ideology among the Syrians, the case study of the Syrian 
intelligentsia in Cairo demonstrates that at the close of World War I identity and 
nationalism varied among the Syrians.  
 There are several broader conclusions that can be drawn from the case study of 
the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. In terms of frameworks for identity and nationalism, 
this case study demonstrates the fluidity of these concepts. The fact that Arabism within 
the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo was so varied based on the aims and perceptions of 
individuals’ supports the notion that the concept of an Arab identity was by-and-large 
manufactured by intellectuals of the day. Furthermore, the fact that so many of the 
leading Syrian Arabists in Cairo begin to more adamantly highlight their Syrian identity 
in the wake of the First World War can be viewed as support for the idea that national 
identity is constantly shifting and as such should be viewed as a fluid construct.  
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 In terms of insight into the size and scope of the early twentieth century Arabist 
movement, this case study is extremely useful. The fact that this is one of the few in-
depth studies of the Cairo as an Arabist center implies that this very important political 
center has been understudied in academia. The fact that Cairo was clearly an area in 
which some of the most active members of the Arabist movement resided necessitates 
that it be considered seriously when attempting to understand the nature of the movement 
during this period. This studied demonstrates that in order to obtain a complete 
understanding of the early twentieth century Arabist movement it is imperative to 
consider the activities of the Syrian Arabists in Cairo. Thus, previous studies that have 
based their conclusions largely on the activities of Damascus-based Arabists present an 
understanding of the size and scope of the Arabist movement that is incomplete. 
 Although this study is significant on several levels, it should also be seen as a 
base upon which I, as well as other scholars can build. There are several interesting ways 
in which the current study can and should be expanded. First, there is a need to 
incorporate how the Arabist ideology propagated by intellectuals resonated with the 
populous classes in Greater Syria. While the evidence in this study does suggest a 
disconnect between the intellectuals and the populous, it would be interesting to examine 
the degree to which Arabist ideology was present within the lower class, as well as 
whether or not Arabism among the populous resembled any of the elite version of 
Arabism.   
 Another area in which this study could be expanded is the incorporation the 
framework of gender. During this period there was a significant women’s press 
developing in Cairo under the guidance of women who had emigrated from Syria. Within 
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the framework employed in this study many of these women would be classified as part 
of the Syrian intelligentsia in Cairo. It would be interesting to examine the relationship of 
the women to the Arabist movement. For instances, it would be intriguing to see if any of 
these women were writing about Arabism and if not, why? 
 In spite of the aforementioned elements not being addressed in this study, this 
thesis does serve as an important contribution to scholarship regarding Arabism in the 
early twentieth century. By appropriately situating Cairo within the broader Arabist 
current this study has aided the understanding of the size and scope of the movement. 
Furthermore, through this case study one can observe important arguments against the 
notion of ideological homogeneity within the movement during this period. Although 
there is still work to be done on this subject, the case study of the Syrian intelligentsia in 
Cairo presented in this thesis allows the reader to not only understand the significance of 
this group, but to gain an appreciation for the necessity of examining often overlooked 
centers of the movement.    
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    Appendix: List of Significant Arabists 
Name    Hometown        Occupation         Religion 
Rafiq Azm                    Damascus               Notable/Journalist             Muslim 
Haqqi Azm                   Damascus               Notable/Journalist             Muslim 
Rashid Rida                  Aleppo                    Publisher/Sheik                 Muslim 
Muhktar el-Suhl           Damascus               Politician                           Muslim 
Iskandar Ammun         Dayr al-Qamar       Lawyer                             Maronite 
Naguib Azoury             Beirut                    Bureaucrat                         Maronite                               
Abdl al-Rahman al-Kawakabi    Damascus           Publisher                            Muslim 
Shakib Arslan                Mt. Lebanon           Student/Publisher               Muslim 
Muhammad al-Din al-Khitab  Damascus               Publisher                            Muslim 
Muhammad Kurd Ali     Damascus               Journalist                            Muslim 
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